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SUMMARY 
International relations are heralding a new era with the 
expectation of a new world order. However, the international 
community is facing a crisis of perception. They are trying to 
apply the concepts of outdated perspectives, such as realism, 
idealism, and Marxism, to an international political reality that 
can no longer be understood in terms of these concepts. The 
emergence of non-state nations, which are threatening the 
existence of the state system, are not integrated into the 
international system by the perspectives. The problem is 
"perspective effect" - one uses perspectives to perceive, 
understand, judge, and manipulate, the world order. Any 
international political issue that does not match conditional 
perception, is ignored and distorted. The result is "perspective 
paralysis" - the perspectives are unable to adjust to changed 
circumstances in the world order. "Perspective paralysis" can be 
overcome if there is a "perspective shift" - perspectives employ 
alternative criteria for evaluating world order. 
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PART ONE 
WORLD ORDER 
CHAPTER l 
INTRODUCTION : WORLD ORDER 
"There wi 11 be no day of days then when a new world order 
comes into being. Step by step and here and there it 
will arrive, and even as it comes into being it will 
develop fresh perspectives, discover unsuspected 
problems and go on to new adventures. No man, no group 
of men, will ever be singled out as its father or 
founder. For its maker will be not this man nor that man 
nor any man but Man, that being who is in some measure 
in every one of us. World order will be, like science, 
like most inventions, a social product, an innumerable 
number of personalities will have lived fine lives, 
pouring their best into the collective achievement." 
H. G. Wells 
The New World Order <1> 
1 Historical Background 
In the history of international relations there have been "great 
debates" which determined the way the international community 
interpreted world order. Each time these debates occurred when 
the international community was entering a new era. The result of 
these debates was invariably a new understanding of world order 
which had to adapt to new forces for international political 
change. Once again international relations are heralding a new 
era which brings with it a changing conception o~ world order. A 
breakdown of past traditions of understanding the world order is 
causing a lack of perspective for grappling with contemporary 
international political issues. Recent history is witnessing the 
transformation of the system of sovereign states. Some existing 
states are showing a tendency of disintegration because of the 
assertion of certain non-state nations. Yet, by neglecting this 
international political force for change, the international 
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community is clinging to an outdated understanding of world 
order. Therefore to gain the understanding necessary for dealing 
with cutTent dilemmas in the emerging "new wot'ld ot·der", the 
international community needs to comprehend the origin and 
development of the ideas that have shaped world views or 
perspectives. This is necessary to be able to ask the questions: 
how did the modern world order come to its present condition? 
And, how should the international community adjust to a wot·ld 
order undergoing transformation? 
In 1917, during the First World War, Woodrow Wilson brought 
America into the war, ta fight "for democracy, for the rights and 
liberties of small nations, <and> for a universal dominion of 
right .... "<2> Wilson introduced "a new world order of ft'ee 
association of peoples''. Idealism was born. Moral principles were 
pursued instead of national self-interest. This brought the 
promise of the rule of law. There was hope that the League of 
Nations, and the Kellog-Briand pact of 1928, which renounced war 
as an instrument of policy, would prevent war. 
But this was not to be. In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria; in 1935 
Mussolini's Italy invaded Abyssinia; and in 1936 Hitler's army 
occupied the Rhineland. <3> The Second World War had begun. This 
aggression had shattered the hopes of the idealists. 
A new understanding of international relations was needed to 
interpret these events. There was a shift in world views, from 
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idealism to realism. This hapoened because during the Second 
World War realist sentiment was strong. The aggression of Italy, 
Germany, and Japan. was seen to be to be synonymous with the 
exercise of power, and the Allied forces saw their response as a 
"just war" against the aggression. 
Although there had been a shift in world views, idealism was 
rekindled again after the war when the United Nations <UN> was 
established. Later there would be disillusionment with the UN's 
performance in maintaining international peace and security. 
The realists of the Cold War made the strategy of containing 
communism a necessity. Opinions in international politics were 
greatly influenced by Hans Morgenthau's book titled ~Q~g~-B~QD£ 
Nations in 1947. In this book he showed his distrust of 
international law. Instead the belief in realism was strengthened 
by his ideas on power politics and his rejection of legalism and 
moralism. The world ot·der had become seen as "a struggle for 
power". He believed that the UN and inte1·national law should not 
prescribe to sovereign states. Like Morgenthau, George Kennan 
condemned legal norms and moral principles, and said that states 
should be motivated by national interest. It was not surprising 
that Kennan thought this way, as he was the American ambassador 
to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics <USSR>. He understood 
the utility of power to further national interest. Another 
advocate of realism was the American Secretary of State, Dean 
Acheson, who once declared that "the survival of states is not a 
s 
mattet· of law." (4) He tt·ied to use pr-agmatic t·eal ism ove,· mo,·a~ 
idealism. "1uch latet". in the 1970's. t·ealist thought was cnce 
again pr-edominant. Henr-y Kissinger- extolled "the maintenance of 
minimum wor-ld ot·det·". He was seeking "a Hobbesian wot·ld wher-e 
power- is the only arbitet· and the only morality." (5) 
Although realism and idealism were the dominant perspectives, 
Marxism had an influence on world views. After the collapse of 
Czarist Russia a new state was formed which was fundamentallv 
different to other nation-states. The new leaders of the Soviet 
state, Lenin and the Bolsheviks, were Marxists. As Marxists, they 
believed that history was the record of the class struggle, and 
that the state only assured the dominance of the strongest class, 
which exp 1 o i ted the weaker c 1 ass. Thet·efot"e the weak et· c 1 ass 
<proletariat> had to seize power from the stronger <bourgeois> 
class through revolution. This Marxist idea of a state threatened 
the international system of states because the Soviet Union would 
call for the proletariat of other nation-states to revolt against 
their "exploitive oppressors". During the time that the Soviet 
Union existed there was constant tension in the international 
system as to what the world order should look like. 
A present new era is arousing interest in a new debate about 
world order. Once more world views, also known as perspectives, 
have to adjust to a new international political reality. There 
are indications that the resurgence of [ethnic] nationalism is 
confronting the current state system~ and therefore the present 
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world order. Traditional perspectives <realism. idealism, and 
Marxism> or world views fail to integrate non-state nations into 
the contemporary international system. 
1.1 Problem: "Perspective E-f-fect" 
The traditional perspectives <realism, idealism and Marxism> 
display "perspective ef-fect" - the i-nternational community uses 
.. 
perspectives to perceive, understand, judge and manipulate the 
world order. Any international issue that does not match 
conditional perception is ignored and distorted. Thus 
"perspective e-ffect" makes the perspectives selective and biased 
as far as the assumptions about world order are concerned. 
Realism and idealism concentrated on relations among and between 
nation-states. They, by being static, ignore another kind of 
actor - the non-state nation. The consequence of "pet·spective 
effect" is "perspective paralysis" - they are incapable of 
adjusting to changed circumstances in the world order. 
The perspectives (realism, idealism, and Marxism> are not 
consistent with international political reality. Non-state 
nations are signi-ficant actors in the international political 
system yet they are ignored. There-fore the perspectives, which 
are used by the international political community, will become 
obsolete if they are not flexible enough and accommodate non-
state nations. 
The question to be asked is: how can "perspective paralysis" be 
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overcome so as to accommodate non-state nations? 
The answet· is that a "oerspective shift" has to take place - t!:e 
peY-spect i ves have to change chaY-acter by accepting al te1· native 
CY-iteria <discussed under the sub-heading Aim>. 
1.2 What is Order and World Order? 
For this study the following concepts will be used: "ot'"der" -
this is identified as a pattern. There is a purpose or goal 
attached to this pattern. An example would be a Y-ugby game. The 
playeY-s all stand in positions and have a goal which is to win. 
the game within the Y-ules. But if the rules are broken during 
dirty play then there is disorder. 
This conceptualization o-f "order" means that although 
peY-spectives display dif-feY-ent chaY-acteY-istics about OY-der, 
"oY-der" has a common chaY-acteristic, and this is that its patte1·n 
has a purpose. In othel'" words "oY-der" is an arrangement that 
sustains a certain goal, which could be peace, stability, 
justice, or even the preservation of the state system. 
"ArY-angement" refers to the basic units of the international 
order and their relationship to each other. The diffeY-ent 
arrangements of "order" could be the realists' system of states; 
or- the idealists' international society; or the Marxists' "world 
society" (which implies the transnational characteristic of 
class). 
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"Wot·ld ot·de~-" - Bull defines it as: "a univet·sal political 
ot·ganization." (6) This means that "or-det· among mankind as a ~"hole 
is something wider- than or-der- among states". Bull makes a 
distinction between inter-national or-der- and wor-ld order- - wor-ld 
order is wider than inter-national or-der. This study does not make 
a distinction between inter-national or-der- and world order as Bull 
does. It accepts that "wor-ld order-" could be "order- among 
mankind" or- "or-der- among states". However, this study does 
attempt to see whether thet·e is or-der "beyond the state 
system."<7> 
It is impor-tant to understand that world order used in this study 
is not utopian at~ a refor-mist strategy to achieve a "just ar.d 
peaceful wor-ld order''. Rather world order is used as a relative 
term. International relations are or-derly in relation to the 
goals of a specific perspective. Although the perspectives have 
different substantive content, they share the same abstract 
conceptualization of world order. In other words, "world or-det·" 
for all three perspectives stands for "an arrangement that 
sustains a certain goal", but each perspective still r-emains 
different in content and structure. Therefore there are rival 
views of world order - a realist world order, an idealist world 
order, and a Marxist world order. 
In this study world order is not seen as a value, rather it can 
be defined as an actual state of affairs or a possible state of 
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affait·s. <8> In othe1- wot·ds disot·de1· is not associated t·Jith t!-ie1·e 
being no "wm-ld m·der-". All that is r-equir-ed in this study, is to 
discover- the distinctive conceptualization of order of each 
per-spective. To be able to do this the ordering mechanisms in 
international affairs need to be examined. World or-der is 
maintained by common rules, common institutions, and common 
interests. <9> Thus order is a function of: balance of powe1·, 
international law (both common rules>, sovereign states, UN (both 
common institutions>, and national inter-ests <common interests>. 
Therefore to understand the nature of world order, one has to 
investigate the structure of world order that each perspective 
provides. Perspectives are normally used to understand 
substantive international relations, but they can also be used to 
understand the assumptions of ordering mechanisms of world order. 
Yalem writes: 
''The problem lies in the failure of scholars to explicate 
clearly the conceptual foundations of world order. Par-t 
of the difficulty also lies in disagreement on the 
relative emphases accorded to law and power as elements 
of order."ClO> 
This study is not unique by bringing the perspectives <realism, 
idealism, and Marxism> into the world order discussion. Wachuku 
writes that: "Three major conceptual schemes have traditionally 
been employed in the discussion of world order - balance of power 
[realism], collective security [idealism] and world 
government."Cll> McKinlay used "models of wor"ld 0t•de1·" - the 
liberal model <idealism>; the r-ealist model; and the socialist 
model <Marxism>. <12> He also sees a link between world order and 
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pet·soectives ("models of wot·ld Ot"der"'' in his easel. Holsti wt·ites 
that Otto van Giet"ke, Martin Wight and Hedley Bull have all 
studied Ot"der under the t"Ubrics of the Hobbesian, Gt"otian, and 
Kantian traditions. ( 13> In the peculiat· terminology used by 
Wight, their Kantian tradition is in the same category as the 
Marxist tradition in this study - both are revolutionary. The 
Hobbesian tradition, and Grotian tradition are equivalent to this 
study's realism and idealism respectively. Thus their studies are 
not dissimilar to this study in approach. 
"New world order" - this concept, as it is developing at pt·esent, 
cannot be defined yet, as it is still emerging. All that may be 
said for certain is that it started with the changes taking place 
in the international system, mentioned under the heading, The 
Need for this Study : A New World Order. It should be added that 
the term "new world order" was propagated, at different times in 
history, first by President Wilson and later by President Bush. 
The new world order envisaged by former President Bush and former 
President Gorbachev would rest "on the rule of law and on the 
principle of collective security.''(14) This implies that the UN 
could use force to maintain or restot"e intet"national peace and 
secut"ity. One may say that there is an evolution towards a new 
world Ot"der. 
The litet"atut"e on world ordet" reveals that it cannot be defined 
in one way. World Ot"der depends on what world view, or 
perspective, one uses - it is a mattet" of pet"spective. Each of 
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the per-spectives (t·ealism. idealism. and Ma!·:-:ism) has its m·rn 
inter-pr-etation of world order. One notices that the aerspectives 
view wot-ld or-de1· as eithe1· a function of intet·national lal'\I C!- c~ 
power-. Thus "wor-ld ot·der-" for- each oer-spective. is a~·ticulate.::~ i:-i 
a not· mat i ve way because they ar-e p1·escr- i pt i ve and state 
pr-erequisites for world or-der. Tr-aditionally <realism and 
idealism> world order was closely associated with sover-eignty, 
national identity, and the state system. These perspectives are 
preoccupied with the relationships amongst nation-states within 
an international system. 
Contrary to the traditional view of world order, this study 
acknowledges the independent behaviour of non-state nations. The 
reason that these non-state nations cannot be left unnoticed, is 
that they have increased their influence on major inte1·national 
issues. In Chapter 2 there is evidence of a bigger wor-ld order 
which stretches the perspectives beyond the state-centric world 
order. This chapter reveals that the world order is pervaded by 
non-state nations which suggests that the world order- has been 
expanding. Thus the only way to study the world order-, is to see 
it as an open world order, a world order which continues to 
expand. Instead the perspectives give an understanding of a 
closed wo1·ld order, one which has stopped expanding. Thus non-
state nations asserting themselves within the world order cannot 
be understood by any curr-ent per-spective. 
The sear-ch for an alternative world order is not restricted to 
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one intet-pt·etation of wm·ld orde1·. The Institute fm- Wo!-~·::! O!-~e'· 
has come up 11dth no less than five meanings of 111orld ot·c:!e,··: "T.,..io 
of the meanings we1·e put·ely desct·iptive: o!·de!- as a~y o!-i-anc;emer.4: 
of reality, order as the relations between the parts. Two were 
analytical - partly descriptive, pa1·t~y not·mative: orde1· as the 
minimum condition for coexistence. The fifth conception was 
purely normative: order as the condition for the good life."<15> 
It is clear from the meanings of world order that world ordet· is 
not merely a value but may also be regarded as an actual 
condition because "order is any arrangement of reality". Thus 
world order studies may concentrate either on a normative order 
or an empirical order. 
There is a relationship between the assumptions of the 
perspectives and world order. From the quotation above, world 
order is "any an·angement of reality" and also "order as the 
minimum condition for coexistence". By reading the following two 
paragraphs, one will comprehend how the perspectives set 
preconditions for world order and how these preconditions are 
based on the assumptions of perspectives. 
The idealist approach to world order is to use international law 
as a framework to control and regulate international behaviour. 
Thus international law is a precondition for order. There is a 
similar view. In this case the UN, as an international 
organization, guarantees world order by intervening in 
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international conflicts and preventing agg~ession cf one sta~e 
agai'lst ancithe~-. Thus the Ul'J as an intet·national ot·gani=aticn is 
the ot·econdition for- ot·det-. 
The r-eal ist appr-oach. which is mot·e ool itical than legal. is 
based on the power- featur-es of the international system. World 
order is a r-esult of national / interest based on rai§Q~_g:gtat. 
Relationships of states are stabilized through nuclear deterrence 
and diplomacy, making the role of power important. Balance of 
power, especially amongst major powers, will affect the stabi}ity 
or instability of the inter-national system. Thus in this case 
sovereign states and the balance of power become the 
preconditions for order. 
1.3 What is a Perspective? 
Perspectives are used by the international community to "impose 
order on reality."(16) In other words the international community 
"constructs its own conception of reality" according to a "plan". 
Thus a perspective is a "plan" of how the "world ordetr" should be 
arranged. Fr-om the sub-heading Histor-ical Backgr-ound it is 
evident that there have been three perspectives in moder-n 
h i story : re a 1 i s m , i de a 1 i s m , a n d Mat" x i s m . 
Because perspectives are used by the international community, 
inteY"national community needs ta be defined. "Inter-national 
community" may be defined as: "everyone with same capacity to 
alter the international political situation." It is not 
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1·estl"icted only to states 01· intet·national 01-ganizations. E!ut it 
also includes scholal"s of wol"ld oolitics who mav influence 
thinking about world Ol"der. 
How can the intel"national communitv descl"ibe the wol"ld 01·det" when 
thel"e ar-e sevel"al "wol"ld Ol"del"s"? Fil"st, it should be unde1·stood 
why there is di sagt·eement ovel" what the war 1 d or det· shou 1 d 1 oak 
like. World order is not described simply on the basis of 
observation, perception is conditioned by the initial assumptions 
of the pet"spectives. Befol"e making any observation, therefore, 
the intel"national community must make certain ~-E~iQ~i 
assumptions about the world Ol"der. Once a basic set of 
assumptions has been established - they al"e normally embedded in 
an accepted perspective - the intel"national community does not 
question the vel"acity of the perspectives which it uses to 
describe the wot"ld order. Infol"mation about the wol"ld order" is 
received and interpreted on the basis of certain perspectives. 
Thus any attempt to answer the question posed at the beginning of 
this paragraph, must begin with the nature of perspectives. 
A perspective is a world view which the international community 
uses to structul"e its perception of wol"ld order. It is 
understandable that because perspectives emphasize selected 
values, there will be tension amongst them. The use of only one 
pet"spective or wol"ld view will distol"t the true international 
political reality. It can best be explained by Hughes's analogy: 
"National leaders and analysts of wol"ld politics use 
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wo1·ldviews in one of three different wavs. Some people 
follow the model of the child given a hammer for 
Chi- i stmas -he or she hammers everything in sight. The 
intellectual version of the 'law of the hamme1-' involves 
forming an extremely strong attachment to a single 
worldview, using it to understand as much as possible, 
and deciding that what the worldview cannot explain must 
be unimportant."<17> 
The problem of competing world views or perspectives, in itself, 
contains the resolution. World order should be understood from a 
combination of all three perspectives or world views. For clarity 
refer again to Hughes, who writes: 
"In thinking about a combination of worldviews, imagine 
the child at Christmas again, given a large pipe wrench, 
a small screwdriver, and a pair of plastic pliers. The 
tools complement each other, but crudely."(18> 
Thus no single perspective can present a comprehensive 
understanding of world order. The consequence is that to deny the 
importance of any perspective is to ignore certain international 
political reality. The perspectives complement each other - each 
deals with different facets of a complex world order. 
Perspectives are normally adopted by the international community 
to understand international politics. But this study is only 
interested in the assumptions of the perspectives which influence 
notions of world order. 
1.4 Conceptual Framework 
It will be argued that the cause of the problem <discussed under 
the sub-heading Problem> is that perspectives unavoidably reflect 
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biases in thei1,· assumotions. !"het·efot·e it is necessa!·v tc:> e>:ami::e 
these ass :..t mot i o n s w h i c 'I f o t" m a n i n t 1 • i n s i c o a r- t o f t he 
pe~·spectives. The most app1·opr-iate way for- examining assumptions 
is to analvze the perspectives according to the functions of a 
per-spective. A per-soective has four functions: <19> 
l> It guides the inter-national community when judgements about 
behaviour- in the world order- (in this case - about war->, have to 
be made. 
2> It tells the international community which are the main actors 
in the world order. 
3> It tells the international community what explanation to 
employ when tr-y i ng ta understand behaviour- in the wor- l d 01· det·. 
4J It tells the international community which solutions to apply 
to international, issues. 
Although a per-spective has four- functions. each per-spective has 
its own set of assumptions regarding these functions. 
The remaining chapters, for the purpose of this study, will be 
examined within a framework of four functions of a perspective. 
1) Judgements - justice versus order-, when judging war- in the 
world order-. 
2> Main actor-s - autonomy ver-sus sovereignty, when identifying 
actors in the world order. 
3> Explanation, or- prescription - "what ought to be" ver-sus "what 
is", when explaining or prescribing behaviour in the world orde1,·. 
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4! Solutions - moral imoerative versus interest. ~hen offeri~g 
solutions to inteirnat1cnal issues in the w0t·ld ot·det-. 
The above conceptual framework needs some clarification. Although 
the four functions of a perspective are constant. the criteria 
which are used within these four functions are variable. For 
example. the criterion to identify main actors in the world order 
is "sovereignty', but it is possible for an alternative c1·ite1·ion 
to be adopted if it is deemed more suitable. This will be known 
as a "perspective shift". The choice of criteria - "justice" 
versus "order", "autonomy" versus "sovereignty", "what ought to 
be" versus "what is", and "moral imperative" versus "inte1·est" -
is explained under the sub-heading Aim. 
Although the conceptual f1·amework vJill be applied to eve1·y 
chapter, the criteria: "justice", "01-der", "autonomy", 
"sovereignty", "what is", "what ought to be", "mo1·al impe1·ative ... , 
and "interest", will be defined according to the context in which 
they appear. 
The framework assesses the consequences of "perspective shift". 
It raises the following kinds of questions. Under what 
circumstances do nan-state nations influence thinking on world 
order? How must perspectives change to be able to accommodate 
non-state nations? And, why should perspectives accommodate this 
phenomenon? 
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1.5 Aim 
The first aim of this studv is to show in Chapter 1 that 
persoectives which do not deal with non-state nations would be 
seriously inadeauate for understanding world politics in a "new 
world ot·der". Thus what is needed is for the intet-national 
community to adapt the existing perspectives to fit the 
emergence of non-state nations. 
The second aim of this study which appears in Chapter 2. is to 
use a real international issue so as to provide the necessa1-y 
opportunities for elaborating the various assumptions r-equit-ed to 
accommodate non-state nations. This is done by analyzing cur-rent 
practice so as to identifv the basic assumptions of the dominant 
perspective. By doing this the study clarifies points of 
disagreement, reveals conceptual inadequacies and inconsistencies 
in reasoning. The purpose is to show that the prior- assumptions 
of the dominant perspective are often incomplete or suppressed. 
In this way priorities are created when alternative criteria are 
developed. Far example, there must be a "perspective shift" -
change of cr-iter-ia - if non-state nations ar-e going to be 
accommodated: 1> to judge war - or-der must change to justice; 2) 
to select main actors - sover-eignty must change to autonomy; 3> 
to explain or- pr-escr-ibe - "what is" must change to "what ought to 
be''; and 4) to offer- solutions - interest must change to moral 
imper-ative. 
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Keep i n rn i n d t ha t the a l t er n a t i v e c t· i t er· i a - " j us t i c e " . 
"autonomv". "1t1hat ought to be". and "mor-al imoet·ative" - ~"'et·e 
developed ft·om a oat·ticular- case. the Palestine question. 
The thir-d aim of this study found in Chapter-s 3, 4 and 5, is to 
identify, explain and explor-e the traditional perspectives of 
realism, idealism and Marxism. The purpose is to see whethet· the 
perspectives are flexible enough to reconcile non-state nations. 
Hence the aim is to reduce or eliminate the biases associated 
with the perspectives. 
The fourth and final aim of this studv, which appears in Chapter 
6, is to examine the implications for choosing any one of the 
perspectives. The basis for choosing is that a perspective should 
be able to accommodate non-state nations. Hence the aim is to 
identify the preferred outcome of accommodating non-state 
nations, and to indicate what the consequences for non-state 
nations and the world order mav be if any other choices of 
perspectives are made. 
1.6 Hypothesis 
The international community will find it difficult, if not 
impossible, to adapt to changed circumstances in the new world 
order, such as the emergence of non-state nations, as long as a 
phenomenon identified as "perspective effect" is allowed to 
prevail. However, the consequence of "perspective effect", namely 
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"pet·soective pat·alvsis". can be ovet·come with a "pet·specti'/e 
shift". 
1.7 Method 
A study of the literature on oerspectives <realism. idealism and 
Marxism> and world order will be undertaken. Therefore this study 
will rely on secondary sources - published papers and books which 
contain the opinions of authors. The first kind of lite1·ature 
which is of importance is that which shows the perspectives' 
contribution to world order. The second kind of literature will 
be about the Palestine Liberation Organization <PLOl which will 
be used to illustrate a world order issue. The study will focus 
on aspects which have direct bearing on the problem of world 
order. 
The method of interpretive criticism will be used to extract a 
given meaning. The interpretation reveals how perspectives defi~e 
what is true or desirable. It is not adequate to merely describe, 
but one must attempt a constitutive <give form tol analysis, 
which explains how international political reality is constituted 
and maintained. Interpretation must expose the political value 
system which perspectives implicitly reinforce or subvert. 
The perspectives establish "sets of values" against which 
existing conduct may be measured and toward which international 
political behaviour ought to aspire. Thus the method used in this 
study has an emphasis on the analysis of values in international 
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r"elations. This makes it oossible to examine row iritet·n-:it:c::2~ 
no~·ms a~·e af~ected ~v i ntet·national issues. and pei·ceive t"le 
dir"ection in which i.-iot·ld 01·de1· is moving. 
A norm can be defined as a standar"d of behaviour. On the basis of 
a norm the international community can deter"mine how an actor 
should behave in the world order". The usefulness of a study of 
norms is that it indicates which behaviout· is "pet·mitted" and 
which is "prohibited". In this way the international community 
can test the behaviour" of actors, they can either appr"ove or 
condemn the behaviour" of international actors. Therefore in this 
study norms will be viewed primarily from the effect they have on 
the features of world or"der. Specifically how the normative 
system is constantly influenced and even conditioned by the 
formation and adaptation of new norms which may come about from 
international issues. There should be no doubt that not·ms a··e 
relevant to an understanding of the world order - its origin, 
stability, and change. 
1.8 Assumptions 
Arguments are based on two assumptions. ll That international 
political conduct has meaning which is expressed in the three 
perspectives. 2l That the ideas about international political 
norms are dynamic and can therefore be negotiated amongst the 
actors in the international political arena. 
The consequence of basing this study on these two assumptions is 
that the orincipal concern is with an understanding of the ways 
in which the intet·national communitv could intet·p1·et and ct·eate 
the wo1-ld ordet·. 
1.9 Limitations 
The main limitation of this study is that only one non-state 
nation, namely the PLO, was used to understand the 
characteristics of a non-state nation. The PLO does not refer to 
the most common form of non-state nation, but to the most 
significant representative form of non-state nation. The PLO is 
thus not an exact reproduction of all the characteristics of a 
non-state nation. However. the Palestinians should be seen as an 
"ideal type" which includes all possible relevant chat·acte1··istics 
that one associates with non-state nations. 
Instead of studying all the new emerging non-state nations, an 
"ideal type" was selected to illustrate how an internati.onal 
issue can influence thinking about world order. 
Because all international issues do not influence notions about 
world order, it was necessary to select an international issue 
which is also a world order issue. This needs some clarification. 
An international issue may be regarded as nothing more than an 
international problem. But a world order issue usually means a 
rapid change within the world order. World order issues could 
encourage international debates <amongst scholars and 
politicians> which are critical of past norms. Thus dominant 
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values and not'"mS al'"e challenged and this mav lead to r:cwrrs 
debate about a 1tJo•-ld orde1- issue could lead to a nonnati'.'e s~ift 
within the inte~-national communitv. The Palest.ir1e question is 
sufficient to make meaningful deductions about how an 
international issue challenges existing international political 
norms. It is a relevant and sufficient example because it ideally 
consists of four sub-issues - how war should be judged; what the 
main actors shou 1 d be; how behaviour in the wor 1 d or de1- shou 1 d be 
explained; and what solutions should be offered to international 
issues - which affect the way the international community 
<includes scholars as well> thinks about world order. 
From the above it should be cleat- that it was the new eme1·ging 
non-state nations that contributed to the rapid change 11Jithin the 
world order, howevel'", the PLO, as an "ideal type", is me1·ely used 
to understand the effect that non-state nations have on the state 
system. 
1.10 The Need for this Study : A New World Order 
On the 11 September 1990, Pt'"esident George Bush addl'"essing the 
United States Congl'"ess, said: 
"We stand today at a unique and ext,,.aot·di nal'"y moment; out 
of these troubled times ..• a new world order can emel'"ge 
a new era - fl'"eer from the threat of terror, strange,,. 
in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest 
for peace."<20> 
"A hundred generations have searched for the e 1 us i 'le 
path to peace, while a thousand wars !'"aged acl'"oss the 
span of human endeavour. Today, that new world is 
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struggling to be born, a ~orld quite different from 
the one we have known, a world where the rule of law 
supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which 
nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom 
and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights 
of the weak."(21> 
On the 13th of April 1991, President Bush addressed American Air 
Force students in Alabama. In this address he stated that a new 
world order would be based on four principles. He said: 
"As the cold war drew to an end we saw the possibilities 
of a new order ••• The new world order ••• refers to new 
ways of working with other nations to deter aggression 
and to achieve stability, to achieve prosperity and, 
above all, to achieve peace. It springs from hopes for a 
world based on a shared commitment among nations large 
and small, to a set of principles that undergird our 
relations: peaceful settlements of disputes, solidarity 
against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals and 
just treatment of all peoples."(22> 
Bush was not the only leader who spoke about the "new world 
order". On the 11 April 1990, President Mikhail Gorbachev, while 
addressing the World Media Association in Moscow, said: "We are 
only at the beginning of the process of shaping a new world 
order."<23> 
Both these leaders were referring to a new world order, in which 
the great powers would co-operate, international law would be 
more important, and the UN would play a greater role. <24> 
After 1987, when the old world began to unravel, leaders started 
to look for new international arrangements. Leaders acknowledged 
that history was being made in the throes of this transformation. 
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Changes have ended the former balance of power world order. 
Communist regimes in Eastern Europe have collapsed, there was the 
demise of communism in the former Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact 
was ended, Germany was unified, and Iraq was expelled from 
Kuwait. C25> The character of the world order is changing. 
Indications of change have engendered a debate which is raising 
questions about the meaning of new world order. There is 
confusion as to how to evaluate the new world order. 
Therefore what one previously knew about world order could no 
longer be applicable today. Perspectives of the past could become 
obsolete. If this is true, then the future does not lie with the 
old logic of realism, idealism and Marxism, but the international 
community should pursue a new vision of the world order. 
The end of the Cold War has thrown the international community 
into disarray. There is uncertainty as to which perspective will 
provide an understanding of the troubled new world order? Without 
a perspective post-Cold War crises could remain ambiguous. 
Bogaturov observed that: 
"The rapid growth of the potential for the emergence of 
ethnic conflicts in the early 1990's took the world 
unawares. The community of nations which oriented itself 
towards containing nuclear challenges and which has 
attained indisputable results in that field turned out to 
be ill-prepared for an adequate response to a new global 
threat. And not because ethnic conflicts are anything 
totally unknown and new but because the entire former 
system of the international management of conflicts 
rested on the unshakeable postulate: the highest inner 
political stability of the main pillars of the world 
structure, the United States and the Soviet Union."<26> 
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The1··e a1·e changes taking o 1 ace which have conseouences fo1· the 
world order. Some unstable states are exoloding into smaller 
ethnic or religious units. Such splintering is done in the name 
of national self-determination. There was a renewed interest in 
national self-determination after the forme1· Soviet Unior. stai·ted 
to disintegrate. The independence given to Latvia. Lithuania and 
Estonia, was the start of the transformation of the global 
system. <27> The dismantling of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia 
has raised the expectations of the non-state nations around the 
world. <28> This makes the world a more dangerous place. Security, 
as it was perceived during the Cold War period, cries out for 
redefinition to cope with the resurgent threat of nationalism. 
These nations are plunging into anarchy. thus contributing to an 
unstable world order. This proliferation of new states indicates 
that something is happening to the traditional state. The 
fundamental unit of the old world order - the nation-state - is 
threatened. Quarrelsome non-state nations, which threaten civil 
wars, have become the new menace. 
There is an international system. not only of states searching 
far security, but also nations struggling for identity and self-
determination. These nations <not nation-states>, which strive 
for their own state. threaten the existence of the state system. 
Holsti comments: 
"War in the second half of the twentieth century has 
become an artifact of ethnic, religious, and language 
nationalism. and not infrequently, of tribalism. It is 
the manifestation of the birth of a global international 
system. the membership of which remains contested in 
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some areas of the world. A high proportion of the wars 
and violence of the era have been perhaps less wars of 
national liberation than wars of national formation. 
They have had everything to do with the creation of 
states, and relatively little to do with the traditional 
causes of conflict in the European-centered states 
system, such as gaining territories, imperialism, 
balances of power, dynastic ambition, and the like.''C29> 
It is clear that nations may reinforce states, but if their 
boundaries do not coincide, nations could destroy states. This 
makes nations significant actors in the world order. Contemporary 
ideas are based on the assumption that the world order is 
synonymous with the state system. Internal conflict between 
nation and state, rather than interstate conflict, is more likely 
to threaten the new world order. Conflict between nation and 
state invariably affects the whole state system. The search for 
national self-determination may well transform the world order. 
Hughes writes: 
"National identities have dramatically transformed the 
state system since the end of the twentieth century. 
Because Gurr and Scarritt (1989> can identify 261 
•numerically significant' nonsovereign peoples whose 
rights are at risk in the current states, that 
transformation appears not yet complete."(30> 
The fight for national self-determination is a powerful force for 
change in the world order. The international community needs to 
consider a new world view or perspective. A lack of perspective 
could ensure that these hostile ethnic national groups continue 
to threaten the desired new world order. Serrill writes: 
"A year after taking office, Boutros-Ghali will not admit 
to disappointment, but it is evident that his ambitions 
to help shape the architecture of a new world order have 
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r-un into tr-ouble." 
"Rightly or- wr-ongly, the Secr-etar-y-Gener-al has in effect 
become the lightning r-od for- dissatisfaction with the 
U.N. and, mor-e gener-ally, widespr-ead fr-ustr-ation at the 
way in which nationalist ambitions and ethnic 
hostilities ar-e thr-eatening to conver-t the desir-ed new 
wor-ld order- into the very opposite."<31> 
However-, befor-e the i nter-nat i ona 1 community can "shape the 
architecture of a new world order" it will fir-st need a "plan" or-
more specifically, a perspective, for r-estr-uctur-ing the wor-ld 
order. Only then will the inter-national community understand the 
significance of "national ambitions and ethnic hostilities" 
within the vision of a new wor-ld order-. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, it will be discussed how this phenomenon ip 
dissimilar to the self-determination of the decolonization 
period. The main difference being that during the time of 
decolonization the integrity of the ter-ritorial state was not 
threatened. Eventually colonists merely left the country they 
colonized. But now the call for national self-determination is 
causing the disintegration of certain states. This resurgence of 
separatism may appear as a throwback to separatist nationalism in 
nineteenth-century Europe when the Austro-Hungarian empire was 
broken-up into various states. But in Chapter 2 it will become 
apparent that these new nationalist movements are different from 
those of the nineteenth century. Basically they are distinct from 
earlier forms of national movements in their inclusion of 
economic, cultural and social dimensions. National self-
determination, for the new national movements, goes beyond mere 
political indecendence. 
In the 1 i ght of the emet·qence of the ot·esent non-state nations. 
it is important to re-evaluate the role of the non-state nation 
in the world order. This studv deems it profitable to examine a 
non-state nation over a time period, a time period which spans 
two eras of international oolitics. The Palestinians, as a non-
state nation, existed during the old order, and exists now in the 
evolving "new world ordet·". The Palestine question reminds the 
international community that suppressed nationalism, once it 
starts stirring, cannot be ignored (see Chapter 2 Non-State 
Nation: PLO>. It is pertinent that the international community 
examine national self-determination. to see whether it promotes 
wot-ld order or whether the violation of the right to self-
determination disturbs world order. The Palestine question is the 
ideal example of a nation striving for self-determination. A 
resolution to the Palestine auestion means that the perspectives 
would have to adapt to a new international political reality. The 
flexibility of the perspectives could serve as a precedent in 
dealing with future crises in the world order. 
The Palestine Liberation Organization <PLO> appears to be 
"deviant" because the pt·inciple of self-determination is in 
conflict with the principle of upholding the integrity of 
sovereign states. Sovereignty remains one of the pilla1·s of the 
o 1 d ot- der. 
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All over the world. nations [not nation-states] are struggling 
for identitv. When oporessed peoole are not hea1·d they usually 
tend to become violent. These trends are reflected in· the present 
emerging world order. National struggles are at the heart of manv 
internal conflicts. 
Non-state nations are not new phenomena in international 
politics. But the unexpected ending of the Cold War is fo1·cing 
scholars of international relations to rethink their basic 
assumptions. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union and the 
collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe. the number of 
non-state nations, searching for statehood. has increased. What 
is needed is that key global issues have to be redefined in the 
new setting. Thus the international community needs to consider 
the prospects for global reform, as existing frameworks are 
practically outmoded because the premises of the state system 
have been eroded to a large extent. In view of this situation it 
is difficult to take the traditional framework for granted when 
considering what kinds of changes are feasible and desirable 
because it is the structure of the world order itself that is 
changing. This study comes to the conclusion that the evolving 
world order does not appear to conform to any of the 
perspectives. 
Some non-state nations may well achieve statehood. However. in 
the old order the significance of the non-state nation was not 
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fullv aooreciated. If this kind of thinking continues. there will 
continue to exist a world order of states coexisting with 
marginalized non-state nations. In other words the perspectives. 
bv excluding the understanding of non-state nations within t~e 
world order, deny an important dimension of world order. 
It is unrealistic to think that the new world order is already in 
place. It will take some time before any new order can be 
discerned. However, Chapter 2 shows how the PLO. as a non-state 
nation, does indeed critically affect the state system's 
structure and essential orocesses. Thus it is crucial to 
understand the role of the non-state nation within the new world 
order. and not delav acknowledging its presence until it first 
achieves statehood. 
1.11 Literature on World Order 
No study of world order is complete without recognizing the 
pioneering work done by the Institute for World Order. The 
institute is run by two international lawyers, Saul H. Mendlovitz 
and Richard A. Falk, who are also in charge of the World Ot·der 
Models Project. The acronym for this project is "WOMP". 
Literature on world order began as an effort from scholars 
writing for WOMP. The first meeting of WOMP took place in New 
Oehli in 1968. <32> This research program was to evaluate whether 
certain values. which WOMP upheld. were diminishing or being 
realized in the world order. Thus WOMP is a framework to study 
global problems. but at the same time it tries to promote a more 
just world order. WOMP is co~~erned with global transformation 
and an alternative future. 
Falk savs that the goal of WOMP l. c:: • :::> • 
di·astic change in the stt·uctut·e of intet·national i·elations and 
participate in a transnational social movement dedicated to 
g l oba 1 t·eform. " ( 33 > WOMP endorses a world order that should 
reflect four values <34> - 1) oeace: 2> economic well-being; 3> 
social and political justice; and 4> ecological balance. 
Cvril E. Black, who is a member of the World Order Studies 
Executive Committee, writes that: "How a world order should be 
.. -\... \_; 
managed is no longer a matter of speculation - it is an issue of 
immediate practical significance."<35l The Institute fat· l.•.Joi·ld 
Order perceives the nature of transformation <36l to be along 
these lines: ll Western domination is coming to an end; 2l the 
nation-state system is disintegrating; and 3> society is becoming 
more global in nature, and not tied to territory. Although this 
transformation of the world order could be examined in broad 
terms, it has a bearing on certain nations (not nation-states> 
trying to create their own state. The transformation the World 
Order Studies mentions, implies that loyalty to the state is 
being transferred to the UN, that the state cannot deal with all 
its problems, and that the state system is obsolete. This 
situation encourages nations. such as the Palestinians who are 
searching for identity, to fight for self-determination. 
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The institute cannot claim to have a monopolv or "\.-.•ci·ld o~·cei·". 
Thet·e a1·e othei· approaches to L..io1·ld 01·de1' besides the one used tv 
the institute. <37) ll System - maintaining approaches. When 
conditions change people using this approach search for 
stability. In 1973 the Trilateral Commission was asked to link 
elites in North America. Western Europe and Japan, regarding 
economic policy so as to create "a stable wot·ld ordet·". Thus any 
world order reform was associated with the Trilateral Commission. 
This kind of thinking took place under Jimmy Carter, as 
president. and Zbigniew Brzezinski, as his chief foreign affairs 
advisor. To ensure political stability, economic issues -
monetary, commoditv, tt·ade and technology - at·e handled b'/ 
international institutions. One notices that in this wm·ld cwdet' 
solutions to issues are not normative but technical. In this case 
the war 1 d or det· is an economic or de1·. 2 l System - 1·efot·m i ng 
approaches. In the 1980's an American institution, the Council on 
Foreign Relations, undertook a study on the future and worked for 
"a •modet·ate' wot·ld ot·der-". Its goal was that policy had to be 
compatible with the interests of a number- of states. In other 
words it had to have a global perspective. Any wor-ld pr-oblems had 
to be solved in a cooperative manner without questioning the 
state-centric system. 3) System - transfer-ming approaches. This 
appr-oach aims to transform the structure of international 
relations by lessening the role of the state. The World Order 
Models Project <WOMPl initiated by the Institute far Wo1·ld Order 
is an example. Anothet' example is Ervin Lasvlo's ~l~b of_Eomg, 
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i.-Jhich coni::enti·ates on the goals of :n.ar"kind. These goa~s a!·e a!:.ou:. 
man's common human destinv. 
These three aoproaches are based on different traditional 
philosophical assumotions. The system-maintaining approach, which 
attempts to sustain the state-system. reflects the realist 
tradition. This approach may allow global reform, such as 
expressed by the Trilateral Commission, but does not allow for 
the reform of the state svstem itself. The system-reforming 
approach, which aims at structural modification but not so 
fundamental as to question the basic ordering of international 
relations around sovereign states, reflects the idealist 
tradition. An important feature of this approach is its emphasis 
on co-operation of states on any global reform. Unlike the 
realists. it does not concentrate on the national interest of a 
single state, but identifies the interests of many states. The 
third approach. the system-transforming approach. may be 
associated with the Marxist tradition. This approach is 
characterized bv a need for global reform by transforming the 
fundamental structure of international relations. 
Theorists have written about world order from three major 
orientations: political-structural, functionalist, and the 
universal-cultural. <38) 
The political-structuralists strive to form international 
institutions to organize world power. This institution should be 
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a confederation of states and should be able to enforce any 
decision the'.' ha'.te collectivelv taken. In the oast. vat·ious 
w1·ite1·s have advocated diver-se ideas on this theme but basical~v 
thev wer-e: world gover-nment: League of Nations; and the UN. In 
the nineteenth centur-y. structures were cr-eated to try and 
achieve peace. Institutions such as the Concert of Europe, whic~ 
was established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, made it 
possible for European great powers to meet. Its main purpose ~as 
to intervene in conflicts so as to rearrange a disturbed balance 
of power. States' strong national interest could exist in a world 
order of mutual obligation as the system depended on the 
maintenance of balance of power. This means that the big powers, 
through co-operation, had to prevent violence within the system. 
The structuralists of the twentieth centurv became more diverse. 
One group believed that international organizations and 
international law should be used ta maintain the balance of 
power. Another group emphasized the importance of the UN. While 
yet another group pursued world government. 
Lassa Oppenheim promoted the idea that international law shou~d 
reflect the power of states. This means that states will comply 
with international law if states act in conformity with their 
national interest. This positive international law favours 
states. 
Opposite to Oppenheim's ideas, are the ideas of Quincy Wright. 
He believed that the UN 1.-1as the best o~-ospect fo1· peace. Wt-ig!:t 
wanted a structural change in the world order. one that would 
give the World Court of the UN more jurisdiction and legitimacv. 
This means that international law could then overrule any 
domestic law. He also wanted the UN's functions to be expanded. 
If this has to happen then states would have to sLwt~ende1· 
sovereignty to the UN. 
The Clark-Sohn proposal deserves special mention. The authors of 
World Peace Throug.b_Worl.Q_b,2~, recommended that a "w0t~ld 
authority" be given the right to use force to discourage the use 
of violence between actors. The Clark-Sohn model for 
international order was a plan for limited world government to 
achieve a warless world. 
The functionalist conception of world order is less concerned 
with balance of power and more with functional p1·oblems such as 
technology, trade, economics etc. Inis Claude writes that 
violence results because of social and economic conditions. 
Functionalist organizations help to alleviate disease, poverty 
etc. In this way war is prevented. 
The third and last orientation is the universal cultural 
conception of world order. For them a comm~n set of values and 
beliefs in the world exist or should exist. For a peaceful and 
more humane world people must be seen as a part of a single human 
family. In this last statement we recognize the ideas of Richard 
Falk. 
The u'1ivet·sal CJ~tu•-2\l con-.:eotion of wot-ld ot·det- car: bes.t be 
explained by saying that thev insist that there must Fi~st ~e a 
wot-ld community 'l'Jhich shares common values befo1·e any :;tt·uct'.~;-3: 
change in the world orde1· takes place. They make it clea1· that no 
world police force. without there being a common culture, is 
enough fot' the attainment of peace, stability, and justice. <39) 
Universal culturalism tries to change man's consciousness instead 
of trying to change economic and political international 
structures, as the structuralists or functionalists do. Universal 
culturalists try to change peoples' minds by changing their 
values and beliefs. and making them aware of human oneness. 
In the three world order orientations just mentioned, one can 
recognize the assumptions of the perspectives of realism. 
idealism and Marxism. Therefore, to really understand wot-ld 01·de1· 
orientations and approaches, the level of assumptions and bases 
of reasoning should be examined. This means that one has to 
return to the assumptions of the perspectives. 
Present research on world ordet·, indicates that it does not focus 
on only one area. Projects carried out through the world by 
institutions bear this out. <40> It is impot'tant to unde1"stand 
that many international issues have a bearing on the world order. 
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Ho1tJ C:c;es this studv build or. existing lite1··atL . .a·e about 1.·;=1-1:: 
o~·de1·.., An ansL·Je1· to this question must sta~-t with the need ~o,- '"' 
new wot·ld ot·det'"'. It seems that Bush's ideas could be impose·j or. 
the wo,..-ld. Is the new wot-ld ordet· to be a Pax Amet·icana. ot· ar. 
euphemism for the United States of America <USA> as world 
policeman? Unlike the literature examined. this study strongly 
suggests that international issues will determine the kind of 
world order that will prevail. The search for a new wot-ld ot·de1· 
will remain elusive as long as the international community does 
not change the way it thinks about world order. Therefore the 
question to be answered is: which perspective is appropriate for 
unde1·standing the evolving new wot-ld ordet·? 
The approaches and orientations mentioned in the ll'Jot-ld rn·de~­
literature. reflect the perspectives of realism. idealism and 
Marxism, on the question of global reform. In the chapters that 
follow it will be argued that the oerspectives are flawed because 
each perspective's normative conception of world order stresses 
the pursuit of a preferred world ordet·. Thus a weakness of the 
perspectives is that they seek to shape a preferred world order 
and are not content with understanding an evolving world order. 
It is therefore difficult for the perspectives to offer an 
understanding which is sensitive to international political 
forces in the world. 
Contemporary thinking about world order is based on the 
c·:ist•..;late tr-,at the state is the fundamer.tal acto1·. This 
ent1·enched 01·thodox conception of ~'llor·ld 01·det· does :iot de5c~·ibe 
the tt·ue t·ealities of wat·ld politics. A close1· laal; at 
international political realitv will reveal that the state is 
losing some of its sup1·emacy as an acto,.- and that the non-state 
nation continues to olay a significant l'"ole in the wo,.-ld ordel'". 
In cont,.-ast to the world order literatu,.-e, this study will 
attempt to understand how non-state nations engage in political 
change. Abstract conceptions used in the lite,.-ature fail ta 
appreciate the dynamics of world politics. Values which are 
embedded in the perspectives should not be imposed an the 
international community, but instead values should be articulated 
in the context of histo,.-ical st,.-ife. <41) In athe1· wo1·ds, new 
nal'"ms may arise from international issues. The Palestine question 
is an ideal case to examine the role of the nan-state nation and 
its challenge ta the sovereign state. During the present 
transition to a new wo,.-ld o~de,.-, the potential of the non-state 
nation to influence global l'"efo,.-m needs ta be studied. 
1.12 Relevance 
This resea,.-ch may have th,.-ee al'"eas of value. ll A contribution to 
the debate of world ordel'". This study has highlighted the role 
inte,.-national issues play in the evolution of wo,.-ld orde,.-. 2) 
Unlocking pel'"spectives on world Ol'"de,.-. This study has revealed 
that the pe,.-spectives are a suitable starting point when 
conside,.-ing issues about wol'"ld ot·del'". 3) Analysis and conclusion 
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as a sasis ~01· fu1~the1· 1·esea1·c...h. The conceptual f~·amewot·k used :. :-
this s tu cv has p1·oved :.o be comor-ehe ns i 'le L·Jhen a na 1 vz i ng ~ ssL~es 
of wo1·ld 01·de1·. 
1.13 Sequence 
Part 1. Chapter 1 Intr-oduction addresses the problem of 
the growing uncertainty and instability of wor-ld order. This 
instability coincides with changes taking place in the wor-ld 
01~de1·. The1~efore this chapter- provides a conceptual f1~amevJ01·k to 
understand the clash of values regarding different wo1-ld vie~s. 
The investigation carried out in this study proceeds in 1·eve1·se 
order: Part 2. Chapter- 2 Non-State Nation PLO e:{ami nes an 
international issue which is conducive to instability. The 
Palestine question raises the issue of international political 
norms which facilitate or suppress emerging non-state nations. 
Thus the analysis focuses on this international issue because it 
has implications for world order. Debates surrounding this 
international issue contribute to ideas about restructur-ing the 
world order. Part 3 contains the critical analysis of the 
assumptions of three perspectives. Chapter 3 Realism examines the 
primacy of force, state sovereignty, balance of power, and 
national interest. Chapter 4 Idealism examines the primacy ~f 
just war, human rights, morals in international politics, 
international law, and the United Nations. Chapter 5 Marxism 
examines the pt~imacy of revolution, class struggle, dialectic 
materialism. and peaceful coexistence. Finally, Part 4, Chapter 6 
Critet·ia of a New Evaluation uses the insights that wet·e derived 
LI 1 
from the p1·evious chaoters and assesses the orospect of an 
alternative world view. Thus this chacter considers the 
oppo1·tunity of perspectives accommodating non-state nations. 
NOTES 
1. Wells,H.G. Th~-~~~-~Q~lg_Q~g§~, Secker and Warburg, London, 
1940, p. 161. 
2. Friedlander,R.A. "Power Politics and International Order", Th§ 
year__§ook of~orl.Q_Bff~i~§, Vol. 38, 1984, pp. 43 - 58. 
3. Smith,M.J. Realism as an AQproach to International Relations 
: A Critical Analysis, Ph.D. Thesis, University Microfilms 
International, Harvard University Massachusetts, July 1982, 
Chapter 2. International law and the League of Nations could 
not prevent these invasions. One can add the invasions of 
Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, by Hitler's army. 
4. Friedlander, ~£it., p. 51. 
5. Ibid., p. 55. 
6. Bull,H. The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World 
Politics, Macmillan, London, 1981. pp. 20 - 21. 
7. Wadsworth,L.W. "On the Meaning of World Order", ~Q.!:.l.Q_ 
Affairs, Vol. 141, No. 2, Fall 1978, pp. 130 - 138. 
8. Yalem,R.J. "The Concept of World Order", Th§_Yea~_!!gok_Qf 
World Affairs, Vol. 29, 1975, pp. 321 - 322. Other definitions 
of world order are: 
1> "Minimum world order - A public order which establishes as 
authoritative, and seeks to make effective the principle that 
force, or highly intense coercion, is reserved in 
community monopoly for support of processes of persuasion and 
agreement and is not to be used as an instrument of 
unauthorized change." 
2> "Optimum world order: A public order which, beyond 
authoritative orientation toward the minimum of coercion and 
the maximum of persuasion ... is further designed to promote 
the greatest production •.. of human dignity values among 
peoples." 
3> "World order as a War Prevention System ...• the avoidance 
of war through the creation of a war prevention system. To 
conceive of world order as the strategy by which one system 
is transformed into another ..• is the essence of the 
undertaking." 
4> "World order as the Negation of World Disorder. The 
concept of world order necessarily assumes a substantive 
differentiation corresponding to the guidelines of the kind 
of order that is proposed. This is manifest methodologically 
by taking such a concept and contrasting it with the possible 
forms of its negation. For it lies in the nature of things 
that our ideas of right and good are les~ exact and definite 
than our notions of wrong and bad. Consequently, the concept 
of disorder, with whose elimination we are concerned, is 
always more easily defined; it facilitates the understanding 
43 
of the diffe1·ent meanings of or·de1·." 
Sl "'A!o1·ld 01·de1· as a Condition .... 01-imarily t:i:.: 1·s . .ce1·e::c::= ':-.= 
t he e >: t e n t a n d f 1 ·e q u e n c y o f po l : t i ca 1 v i o 1 e n c e . " 
6l "t.Jc1-ld 01·de1· as a l)alue. 01·de1· is :-iot me1·e!y an a·="::·_;2.~ 8'-
possible condition or state c-f affait'"S in v-!Ot'"l,j politics, it 
is also gene1·al ly 1·egarded as a value. A patte1·n 01· stn . .:.ct:.!1·e 
of human 1·elations such as to sustain the elernentat""/ 01· 
pr·imary goals of social coexistence among states." 
9. Bull, Q~.-£.i1·, pp. 65 - 74. Bull indicates that common 1·ules, 
common institutions, and common interests are all necessary 
and sufficient for the occurrence of international order. 
10. Yalem, op. cit., p. 320. 
11.Wachuku,A.N. Self-Determination and World Order, Ph.D. Thesis, 
Purdue University, Indiana, 1977, p. 4. 
12.McKinlay,R.D. and Little,R. Global Problems and World Order, 
Frances Pinter, London, 1986. 
1 3 • Ho 1 s t i , K • J . l.b.§._ D i y.i.Q.i.JJ.9._fil s c i p l.i.!:!.!L.!.._!:::!.§.g.§.!!}Q.!J.Y a n d D i v e r s i t y: 
i..!:!_l.!Jter.!J~1.iQ.!:!~_lheory, Allen and Unwin, Boston, 1985, p. 27. 
14.Russett,8. and Sutterlin,J.S. 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 7~, No. 
"The U. N. i n a New vlo 1· l d 01· de,-" , 
2' 1 991 ' p . 69. 
15.Jahnson,H.S. and Singh,B., Chapter- 14 11 Self-Oete1··rr1ir.ation ar.:: 
Wot'ld Orde1·", in Alexandet·,Y and Friedlander,R.A. (ed. l _2gl£.:: 
Determination : National, Regio.!:!21.i. and Global Dimensicns, 
Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1980, p. 358. 
16.0pen University, World Politics, paper 1, Wo.!:.1.g_PoJ..i1.i£§_lD 
Pe~spec.tJ.ve, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1985, 
p. 18. 
17.Hughes,B.8. Continui.!:.Y_2.!:!Q_Qbanq_!Lin_~.Q!:.1.Q_fQJ..i1.i£2._1.._Thg 
gJ.ash Qf_E.§.rsgectiY.§.§, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1994, p. 
484. 
18. I big. 
19.0pen University, Qih._£i1·, pp. 5 - 6 and 21 - 23. 
20.Up to this point of the speech, Coker recorded it slightly 
diffet·ently. See Coker,C. "Bt·itain and the New World Orde1· 
The Special Relationship in the 1990's 11 , l.!:!1.§.~.!:!~1iQD2l 
Affai.!:.§, Vol. 68, No. 3, July 1992, p. 409. 
21.Roberts,A. "A New Age in International Relations?", 
Intet·national Affai1·s, Vol. 67, No. 3, July 1991, p. 519. It 
was during the Gulf War that the phrase 11 ne1rJ war 1 d 01· de!"" 11 
started to be used. It suggested an order against agg!""essors. 
:2.T:ing~·Je:1,P. "New Wa~·ld Ot·de~- - Acco!·dir.g tel M!·. 
8.§.~i§.'.:::'., 1.lc:!.. "34, !\lo. 43, Octobe!· ~8 - !'Jo\·e:-:-:t:e!· 
23.RClberts, 22~-£~1·. p. 519. 
24.Russett and Sutterlin. Q2~_£11·, pp. 69 - ea. 
25.Roberts, ~-£11-, p. 509. 
Bus ri 11 ~§.lli1:.;. 
...,. , 001 ·- 0 
·- .... . .... ' ·-. 
26.Bogaturov,A. "Self-Determination of Nations and Conflict 
Potential", l..QternaliQ.!J.§l_.B.ff.§.i.!:..§., Vol. 68, No. l, Mat·ch 
1992, p. 14. The potential for internal conflict Bogaturov 
wrote about did later become a reality. By 1995 the major 
internal conflicts threatening international stability were: 
Somalia, Bosnia, Chechnya, Rwanda, and Angola. 
27.l.Q.!_g., pp. 5 - 15. 
28.Hornblower,M. "States of Mind"~ Ilmg, Vol 141, No. 5, 
1 February 1993, pp. 44 - 45. Hornblower reported on a 
conference held in the Hague. Many "peoples" from five 
continents were present, including Kurds from Iraq. Ogonis 
from Nigeria. Nagas from India. Frisians from Holland. Shar. 
from Burma. Mapuches from Chile and Argentina. He wrote that 
they agreed on one goal: self-determination. An important 
comment was ma de at this confet""e nee by the Sect·eta~·y-Gene1· al 
of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization <UNPOl. 
"Thet""e are some 5 000 distinct peoples in the wo1·ld", said 
UNPO Sec1·etat""y-General Michael van Walt. "But fewer than ::.'00 
states are recognized. Many groups want only basic human 
rights and their cultural identity. But others, perhaps 50, 
have the historical and political legitimacy to form new 
separate states". 
29.Hughes, QQ~_cit., p. 232. See also p. 233. Hughes mentions 
some other minority ethnic groups in search of identity: 
Basques in Spain; Sikhs in India; Kurds in Iran, It·aq, and 
Turkey; Dinkas in the Sudan; Quebecois in Canada; Scots and 
Welsh in the United Kingdom; and the Catholic Irish in 
Northern ll'"eland. One may add the Flemish and Walloons in 
Belgium. See also pp. 234 - 239. Hughes explores instances of 
nations and states not coinciding. His cases come from the 
former USSR, the former Yugoslavia <Croats and Se1·bsl, the 
Middle East, and Africa. 
30.l~.!_g., p. 258. 
31.Sen·ill,M. "The U.N. in the New Wot·ld Disorder", I.img, Vol. 
141, No. 3, 18 January 1993, p. 17. 
3 2 . Fa l k , R . A . 6_§ tu _Qy of _Eu t ~r.g_.!tlQr.l..Q§ , The Free Press , Ne ttJ Y c 1d · 
1 975' p. x >:. 
45 
3 3 . Fa l k . R . A . Th g_£~.Q_Q£_~Q.!::l~_ O t· Q§..!..:__: _s§~.§.:::'.__2_ o ''-~£ ·· m .§.!. :. v ~ 
lnte.!::D.§. t iQDi!.l_.8.§1£1.iQD.§., Ho 1 mes and Mei e!·, New "c!·k, ! 9~~, ~. r- • 
7 7 • See a l so Me :: d l o v i t :: . S . !-I • " T he P 1 • o g t· am o f t he ~ r: s t i t •..: ':". :? .r. - ,. 
\>.Jo r- l d 01· de 1· " • ::I2~.!..:.D.§.l_Q£_lD1§.!..:.~~~l;:.::.§.l_2££~.i.C~, ' ' - ' ..,. ' ~' -
2. Fall/Wir.te1· 1977, pp. :'61 - 264. Mendlovit: e:--:;:13:.:-::: •-,.:::•·• 
l!JOMP is diffe!··er:t to othe!· wc1·ld O!"de1r :ipp!·oaches. Fot· e~:ample 
l<issinge1·'s ideas on secut·ity may r-ealize the need "'"::J!. c~:-:?.ng~ 
but mar.ages it so that the holdet·s of powet· and \\IO:?alth 5!"E' nc:':. 
effected. The Institute for- World Order is concerned ~ith the 
problem <crisis of world order) as a whole by war-king ~er 
humanity. 
34.Mendlovitz,S.H. "A Perspective on the Cutting Edge of Wot·ld 
Order I nqu i t·y : The Past, Pr-esent and Fu tur-e of WOMP", 
ln.t.erna.t.iona_l_lnter2£1iQD§, Vol. 8, No. 1 - 2, 1981, p. 154. 
35.Black,C.E. et.al. 6_Ne~-~Q~lfj_Qrde1r?, World Or-der Studies 
Program Occasional Paper No. 1, Center of International 
Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public International 
Studies, Pr-inceton Univer-sity, Princeton, New Jersey, 1975, 
p. 3. 
36.Mendlovitz, Q~_£i1·• 1977, pp. 260 - 261. 
37.Falk,R.A. "Contending Approaches to World Order", .J.ou.!::D.§.l_Qf 
lD1§~D21ion2_l_6f£2i~.§., Vol. 31, No. 2, 1977, pp. 183 - 189. 
See also Ajami,F. "World Order- The Question of Ideology", 
Al1§~D21ive.§., Vol. 6, 1980, p. 476. 
38.Bet·es,L.R. and Tat·g,H.R. "Pet·spectives on Wor-ld Ot·de!- : A 
Review", Alternatives, Vol. 2, No. 2, June 1976, pp. 177 -198. 
Many writers who wrote about the evolution of world order- 3re 
r-ecorded in this article. 
39.Ibid., p. 194. 
40.Sewell,J.P. ~Q~lg_Q~de~-~1~2i§§_l._6_g~i1is2l_s~2miD21iQD, 
Monograph 43, Center of International Studies , Woodrow Wilson 
School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton 
University, Princeton, July 1974, pp. 9 - 32. Wor-k has been 
done in the following areas: ll Peace research. 21 Conflict 
and its resolution. There is widespread inter-est in the 
identification and analysis of conflict e.g. Middle East, 
Northern Ireland etc. The struggle for independence is 
characterized as conflict. 31 Systemic modeling. Studies of 
alternative world models e.g. WOMP, Club of Rome , etc. a1 
Transnational organizations and movements. 51 Regional 
integration. 61 Technology, resources, demography, ecology 
assessment. 7> Political economy. 8l Arms control and 
disarmament. 91 Compa1·ative foreign policy. 101 Human !·ights. 
11 l lntergovet·nmental atrganization. And 12) "The p1·oblem of 
implementation in policy sciences". 
!16 
Numbet- t:..-Jc above shc1·;s that the Palestine q~esti=~ 
For- \l'Jot-k dor•e on ~'llot-ld o~-de;-, see: 
"1ittelrnar..J.H. "l•Jo;-ld Or·det- Studies and Inte;-natie:n2.l 
Political Ecanomy 11 , 6.lig.ciJ~1.i~.§.§., Vol. 9, No. 3, Wirite~· 
1983/1984, pp. 325 - 349. 
Bet'"es,L.R. "Wo;·ld Or·de;- Ot-ientations to Intexnational La~--J", 
Westel""n_Pollti£~_l_Qu~~te1-ly, Vol. 29, No. 1, Mat'"ch 1976, 
PP. 29 - 42. 
Black,C.E. and Falk,R.A. Ibg_E~1Ul""§_Qf_1bg_lD1§~D21iQD~l 
Legal Ot'"det'" : Retrosggst_and E~Q§Qgct, World Ot'"der Studies 
Program Occasional Paper No. 11, Center of International 
Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International 
Affairs, Pt'"inceton Univet'"sity, Princeton, New Jersey, 1982. 
Kaplan,M.A. "Steps towat'"d a Democratic Wot·ld Orde1·", 
Intg~natiQD~_JQ~~na_l_QD_Wo~l~_Egacg, Vol. 6, No. 3, 
July/September 1989, pp. 23 - 44. 
41.Targ,H.R. "World Order and Futut'"es Studies Reconside1·ed", 
tll1§~D21ive§, Vol. 5, No. 3, Novembet'" 1979, p. 376. 
PART TWO 
A WORLD ORDER ISSUE NON-STATE NATIONS 
CHAPTER 2 
NON-STATE NATION PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION <PLO> 
2 Introduction 
The Palestine question is concerned with the confrontation of two 
nationalisms which lay claim to the same land. Palestinian 
nationalism and Jewish nationalism both emerged from their 
respective historical roots in Palestine. In 1947 the UN proposed 
a partition of Palestine, the creation of an Arab state and a 
Jewish state. The Arabs rejected the proposed partition as they 
refused to recognize the validity of the UN resolution. As a 
result of several wars with neighbouring Arab states, Israel 
gained control of areas previously allocated by the resolution to 
the Palestinian Arab state. Ever since then the Palestine 
Liberation Organization <PLO> has been struggling for national 
self-determination in the occupied territories of the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. 
This chapter will use the PLO, as an "ideal type" non-state 
nation, to illustrate how the existence of non-state nations may 
have repercussions for the world order. The PLO is not only a 
simple international political issue, but is also a world order 
issue because it challenges existing international political 
norms concerning world order. One may well ask: "why is only one 
non-state nation, the PLO, used to illustrate the impact of a 
non-state nation on ideas about world order?" The answet· is that 
the PLO's struggle for recognition of its national aspirations 
has acquired international recognition. A resolution of the 
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Palestine question can serve as a model for the resolution of 
similar problems experienced by other non-state nations. A new 
understanding could help either to avoid the repetition of 
internal conflicts or to assist in their resolution rather than 
to allow them to exacerbate an already unstable world order. 
An analysis of the PLO discloses why questions regat·ding the 
aspects of the Palestine question affect views on world ot·der. 
Many writers have put forward alternative viewpoints regarding 
the various aspects of the PLO. These alternative views have made 
the international political community aware that other 
interpretations are possible. For example: 1) the criterion to 
recognize main actors in the world order is their "sovereignty". 
If the criterion of "autonomy" is used instead as an alternative 
then the PLO may be defined as a significant actor. 2) Also 
traditional war is justified by the "just war" doctrine, which 
relies on the criterion of "order". But by using the criterion of 
"justice", the PLO's non-traditional war may also be justified as 
though by the same doctrine. 3) Revolution is mainly explained by 
scientific theories using the objective criterion of "what is". 
But the PLO's revolution may be seen as part of the dynamics of 
world order if the normative criterion of "what ought to be" is 
used. 4) Solutions to international issues have always taken the 
criterion of "national interest" into consideration. But the PLO 
question has presented a convincing alternative based on the 
ct·iterion of the "moral principle of self-detet·minatior,". 
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The PLO question is not the only world order issue to affect 
views on world order. But views on this particular world order 
issue challenge four accepted views on 1) how war should be 
judged in the world order; 2> what the main actors in the world 
order are; 3) how behaviour in the world order should be 
explained; and 4) what solutions should be offered to 
international issues. 
In Chapter 1 it was mentioned that a perspective has four 
functions. Thus to understand the affect the PLO, as a non-state 
nation, has on the structure and processes of the state system, a 
framework of four functions of a perspective will be applied to 
this international issue. The framework is: 
1> Judgements - justice versus order, when judging war in the 
world order. 
2> Main actors - autonomy versus sovereignty, when recognizing or 
selecting main actors in the world order. 
3) Explanation, or prescription - "what ought to be" versus "what 
is", when explaining or prescribing behaviour in the wor-ld or-de1~. 
4) Solutions - moral imperative versus interest, when offet·ing 
solutions to international issues in the world order. 
Each of the four functions mentioned above will be discussed 
respectively under the following headings: Just War; Definition; 
Revolution; and lastly, National Self-Determination. 
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The conclusion is that the dominant perspective resists any 
change to its world view in spite o+ alternative criteria 
suggested by author-s - it remains in "perspective par-alysis". 
2.1 De-finition 
The de+inition o+ the PLO is crucial in deter-mining its status as 
a main actor- in the world or-der-. Defining the PLO as a main actor 
is hindered by the concept of sovereignty which recognizes only 
nation-states as main actor-s. According to some writers, the 
defining characteristic o+ a main actor in the wor-ld order is not 
the legal criterion o+ "sovereignty", but rather the behaviow-al 
cY-iterion of "autonomy". Cl) 
In a wor-ld order of sovereign nation-states the PLO is seen as 
some kind o+ political disease or irrational phenomenon. 
Sometimes the PLO member-s ar-e ca.stigated as being "terr-orists". 
It will be argued that this definition is inaccurate and too 
narr-ow. Alternative de+initions from var-ious writers will be 
explored. This section will discuss how the de+inition o+ the PLO 
may a++ect its status as a main actor in the world order. There 
is a status attached to sovereign nation-states which rests on 
the assumption that international politics can only be about 
r-elations amongst sovereign states. But the characteristics of 
the PLO challenge the notion of the nation-state as the only main 
actor in the world order. Because the PLO exercises a significant 
level of influence in world politics, it may be said that its 
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behaviour tends to be autonomous. Assuming this to be true it is 
invalid to employ solely the criterion of sovereignty to identify 
main actors. 
This section will introduce writers who ask the international 
community to deviate from the conservative bias of sovereignty, 
to avoid construing an incomplete world order by ignoring 
autonomous behaviour of non-state nations. Their view is that an 
appropriate, adaptable criterion to identify main actors in the 
world order is needed. Failure to do this will obscure certain 
actors' true impact on the world order. They argue that the legal 
criterion of "sovereignty", should give way to the behaviou1~a1 
criterion of "autonomy", to define main actors in the world 
order. 
To develop a definition of the PLO, this section will rely on the 
following argument as a basis for discussion: a definition that 
will locate the PLO in a class (international actors) and 
enumerate the characteristics that make it differ from other sub-
classes <nation-states, international organizations, etc.> in 
that class, and therefore allow it to be assigned to a sub-class 
<non-state nations). The aim is to distinquish the PLO from other 
sub-classes. After this has been done, the significance of the 
non-state nation in relation to the state will be indicated. This 
leads to the question of why the non-state nation is not 
recognized as a main actor. 
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Smith wr-ites that: "among 'the most basic presuppositions of the 
states system' is the principle that 'only states may 
legitimately employ violence against each other' .''<2> This remark 
draws attention to the view that at pr-esent only sovereign states 
have monopoly over- international violence. The wor-ds: to 
"legitimately employ violence against each other" imply that 
nation-states are recognized as sovereign main actors by other 
nation-states. Despite the rise of non-state actor-s, sovereignty 
continues to exclude them from any recognition akin to statehood. 
Some politicians call their opponents "terror-ists", while calling 
revolutionary movements, who are their- allies, "freedom 
fighters". Pr-esident Reagan while addr-essing the Amer-ican Bar-
Association in Washington, D.C., on the 8th July 1985, called the 
PLO one of the "world's most vicious terrorist groups."(3) 
Reagan's speech reflected the gener-al American attitude towards 
national r-evolutionary movements using ter-r-or-ism. This attitude 
is based on the r-ationale contained in the US Department of 
State's definition of terrorism, as: 
"the threat or- use of violence for political purposes by 
individuals or- gr-cups, whether- acting for or in 
opposition to established gover-nmental author-ities, when 
such actions are intended to shock, stun or intimidate a 
target gr-oup wider than the immediate victims."(4) 
"Terr-or-ists" is not an appropriate definition for- the PLO because 
it sounds like a mor-al judgement. This definition could be used 
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for moralized name-calling. It engenders extreme emotions as a 
reaction to horrors associated with it. The PLO, when defined as 
"terrorists" in the foregoing terms, is condemned as morally 
repugnant. Mot·eover, the definition of "terrorists" is too 
narrow. Later on more important characteristics of the PLO will 
be discussed. These charactet·istics are both necessary and 
sufficient for the PLO to qualify as a separate sub-class of the 
class "international actors". But first other possible 
definitions need to be explored. 
Does Hutchinson's definition of "revolutionary terrorism"(5) 
apply to the PLO? "Revolutionary terrorism" he defines as "a pa1~t 
of insurgency strategy in the context of internal warfare or 
revolution: the attempt to seize political power from the 
established regime of a state, if successful causing fundamental 
political and social change". This definition is also 
inappropriate because it defines the action and not the nature of 
the PLO. 
Could "national revolutionary movement" be an appropriate 
definition for the PLO? During the 1950's and early 1960's, there 
was a struggle of subject peoples against colonial rule. The 
colonial peoples fighting for self-determination were known as 
national revolutionary movements. MacFarlane defines national 
revolutionary movements as: "groups engaged in struggle against 
foreign rulers or against indigenous regimes deemed to be 
dependent upon and subservient to outsiders and indifferent to 
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the basic needs of the populations those regimes purported to 
serve."(6) This definition, although dated, may be appropriate 
for the PLO. Before this definition may apply to the PLO, certain 
conditions must be met. 
The definition above contains something more than just political 
revolution or national self-determination. MacFarlane's book 
makes it clear that economic and social revolution is included in 
the definition. Therefore the aims of the PLO must not only be 
national self-determination, but it must also include economic 
and social revolution. 
Non-state actors are not always understood for their 
capabilities. National revolutionary movements are "significant 
actors" says Hutchinson because "they possess autonomy, control 
of substantial resources relevant to a given issue area, and 
participate in political relationships across state lines." (7) 
There are other, more noteworthy characteristics pertaining to 
national revolutionary movements than the use of terrorism. The 
PLO, as a national revolutionary movement, aims to acquire 
national territory, because it wants to be recognized as a nation 
able to create a Palestinian state. (8) 
Although there are contradictions in the state-centric world 
order, it continues to rest on the concept of sovereignty. The 
behavioural attribute of autonomy has not been integrated into 
the dominant state system perspective. Mansbach makes the comment 
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that: "While all nation-states are 'sovereign', many are unable 
to make decisions independently or to influence people situated 
outside their political boundaries; whereas nonstate actors lack 
sovereignty, many are relatively ~~1QDQ!!!Q~§ and iDfl~en1i~l-"<9> 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the doctrine of 
sovereignty might have been appropriate to identify international 
actors. (10) Today it may prove inadequate as some nation-states 
do not appear to be homogenous. As some governments lose 
authority over their citizens, they may appear not to be in full 
control of their territory. A system of sovereign states is no 
more than an ideal type of international structure, it is not 
international political reality. These deficiencies in the 
realities of sovereignty point to the irrelevance of the state-
centric perspective. In the contemporary world order certain non-
state actors behave independently although they are not 
recognized as sovereign. In Mansbach's view: 
''It is increasingly evident that in the contemporary 
global system, as in political systems that existed 
before 1648, nonstate actors, often 'transnationally' 
organized, possess their own military capabilities, 
economic assets, and sources of informations. The 
Palestinian guerrilla groups, for instance, dispose of 
organized military forces, negotiate formal agreements 
with Arab states, and threaten to undermine diplomatic 
understandings that were painfully achieved by 
representatives of major powers."(11) 
In the quotation, the PLO is defined as a non-state actor. This 
definition is too broad, as non-state actors also include actors 
such as the UN, trade unions, multinational corporations etc. The 
definition above excludes an important characteristic of the PLO 
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- it represents a nation. 
I+ the +oregoing arguments are true, the manner in which 
international actors are defined as main actors is inadequate. 
The PLO appears to be challenging the status of the nation-state 
as a main actor. Thus it is not all non-state actors which pose 
this challenge but only one kind of actor - the non-state nation 
<NSN>. There+ore, how should the PLO, and other non-state nations 
be identified? Bertelsen writes: 
"In general, groups that seek complete sovereignty 
include liberation movements <most of the movements 
leading to independent African states, for example>, 
secessionist movements <such as Biafra and Bangladesh), 
movements to establish national states in territories 
being divided after wars (for example, many Arab states 
as well as Israel, with reference to the Ottoman 
Empire), and movements to conquer currently existing 
states and establish the NSN as a state in the territory 
(for example, some current Palestinian Arab groups with 
re-ference to Israel)."(12> 
The quotation indicates that there were non-state nations in the 
past which sought complete independence -from a nation-state. This 
existence of non-state nations in the past is significant for the 
argument. States were fragmented into two or more nation-states. 
This break-up of states altered the number and character of 
certain nation-states in the world order. Thus the phenomenon may 
be old, but a new perspective is needed because the consequences 
o-f non-state nations are bound to continue. 
A definition of an actor in the world order should be value 
neutral. This definition should transcend mcral judgements on the 
actor. The de~inition should be precise enough to provide a 
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meaning~ul device to identi~y main actors in the world order. 
Rather the PLO should be defined as a non-state nation, or in 
Bertelsen's words: 
"any entity that operates in a manner associated ~·Jith a 
nation-state but is not a generally t-ecognized nation-
state. The defining characteristic o~ the NSN is its 
assertion or action implying sovereignty, while not 
being generally recognized as a sovereign entity."(13) 
The quotation alludes to the non-state nation being equal to the 
nation-state in autonomous action. It is not given full 
recognition because it lacks the sovereignty of the nation-state. 
Bertelsen writes that the non-state nation "desires to remain 
both durable and audible ... ". It is impossible to ignore the 
presence of non-state nations that have played central roles in 
many of the con~licts in the world order. Nevertheless, 
sovereignty remains the defining attribute of an international 
actor. This section has argued that the international community 
needs to alter its perspective from the legal criterion of 
"sovereignty" to the behaviout-al criterion of "autonomy" to 
identify main actors. Bonanate expresses these sentiments when he 
writes: 
"The Palestinian movement has the peculiarity, 
nonetheless, in having discovered a type of original 
international struggle that is directed against a 
[sovereign] state. Thus, the Palestinian problem is not 
only geographical but, in order to be solved, requires 
changes in the very structure of the international 
system." ( 14) 
The discussion on definition indicates that the PLO may be 
correctly defined as a national revolutionary movement or a non-
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state nation. Because the PLO evolved during different phases, it 
was correctly de-fined as a national revolutionary mo'./ement in the 
early phases while now it can be more appropriate to define it as 
a non-state nation. The two definitions are not exclusive. 
Previously it was mentioned that the liberation movement is a 
non-state nation. The pt·eference fat· the definition of "non-state 
nation" rests on an attempt to transcend moral judgement. 
However, for the rest of this study a non-state nation will 
sometimes be referred to as a national revolutionary movement so 
as to place it within an historical context. 
2.2 Just War 
The "just wat~" doctt~ine is a ft·amework which is used ta evaluate 
the morality of war. As it now stands, the doctrine permits war 
to preserve peace, order and stability between states rather than 
promote a moral ideal, such as national self-determination. To 
non-state nations fighting for self-determination, this peaceful, 
stable order, appears as an unjust order. The dominance of 
~ealQ.£1.it..!..k with its notions of national interest defined in 
terms of power, makes order the primary value of just war, 
instead of it being the promotion of "justice" per- se. 
Traditional wars may be judged according to the "just \.-Ja~-" 
doctrine. This traditional approach underlined an order of 
states' rights. At present the nature of war is being redefined. 
Wars are frequently waged within countries rather than between 
them. For this study b·aditional wars may be defined as "1.-Jat·s 
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between states". In contrast to traditional ~"'ar, a non-
traditional war may be defined as "a war that takes place within 
the borders of a single state." Hence it is an "internal wat-". 
Non-state nations may be engaged in many kinds of "internal 
wars", but this study is concerned with only one kind of non-
traditional war, namely "revolutionat·y war". In this section 
alternative approaches by certain writers will be presented. 
These adaptations to the just war doctrine indicate two changes: 
1> that a just war may be waged to vindicate justice, not only to 
restore order; and 2> that it may be possible to apply the just 
war doctrine to non-traditional internal wars. The outcome of 
such an international debate will most certainly have important 
consequences for the world order. In addition to asking: "ho1-J 
wi 11 wars be judged?" the new question may be: "how are wars of 
national revolution <such as those waged by the PLO> to be 
judged?" 
The Palestine Liberation Organization's <PLO> revolutionary war 
resembles a just war. <15> Because it is a war against 
"oppressors" by definition, it implies that the PLO is fighting 
for a just cause. Violence in pursuit of a just cause is regarded 
as justified. Therefore the PLO bases its argument on the just 
war doctrine. However, just war doctrine is usually applied to 
only traditional war. The concept is not customarily applied to 
revolutionary war. If there are to be judgements of "just wal'"" 
based on justice and not only on order, then the doctrine of just 
war should also apply equally to revolutionary war in a new world 
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To determine whether the concept of just war may be applied to 
revolutionary wat~, the PLO will have to justify their resort to 
war-. 
The historical origins of the just war tr-adition can be traced to 
Augustine o+ Hippo. (16> He wr-ote at a time when the Vandals wet·e 
attacking the Roman Empire. His concern as a Christian was to 
justi-fy war under certain circumstances. For him, justice was 
mor-e important than peace or- order and just wars could be used to 
pr-otect human beings. <17> The consequences of St. Augustine's 
views o+ just war ar-e that only one side possesses justice and 
that a "just" war is similar to a "holy" war. This was so because 
the assumptions were based on Chr-istian mar-al philosophy. 
Machiavelli rejected the Christian notion of just war in favour 
of self-interest. In his time nation-states rather than religion 
had begun to dominate international politics. To him war was 
justified if it preserved the state. Eventually, however, the 
notion of just war was discar-ded by governments after the Peace 
o+ Westphalia, in 1648. 
Grotius was responsible for transforming the doctrine of just war 
from one based on Christian values to one based on modern secular 
values. 118) These secular values, for Grotius, were to be found 
in international law. Grotius did not seek to eliminate war but 
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tried to limit wars between nation-states. In addition he did not 
seek justification for wars. Grotius's idea of justice is the 
contract between nation-states to "act on the basis of law". The 
aim of these contracts is to preserve order. 
One can conclude that for Grotius the purpose of just war was to 
keep peace and order and to aim for a stable world order. This 
was different from St. Augustine's purpose of just war which was 
justice. Grotius was more concerned with order which to him was 
the right of states and the "just" grounds for war. 
One component of just war doctrine is jus in bello <the just 
conduct of war>. <19> This refers to what is just in times of war 
or the management of force. The focus is on the limits of the use 
of force. According to l~§_i~_bell.Q three principles determine 
the limits on the conduct of war: 1> proportion; 2) 
discrimination; and 3> prohibited means. 
Pr-oportion. The principle of "proportion" requires 
"pr-opor-tionality o-f military means to political and military 
ends". For example, the means used in a war- must be justi-fied by 
the political purpose. This is to say, that the good resulting 
from a successful war must be balanced against the evil of the 
way war-s are waged . 
.Qi§.£.!:.iilli~atio_Q. The principle of "discrimination" refe~-s ta t!-1e 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants during a time 
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of war. 
PrQ.b.i..Q.i.1§.Q_f!l§§.ns. The principle of "prohibited means" consists of 
two parts. One part prohibits means because they are inherently 
wrong. This is based on morality, natural law or on the idea of 
humanity. An example of this would be genocide. On the other 
hand, means of war may be prohibited by international law. 
Examples of this are: "means causing superfluous suffering, 
chemical warfare, biological warfare, and grave offenses against 
the law of war as defined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 
1977 Geneva Protocol."<20) 
Jus in belle has been examined above. However, the just war 
doctrine consists of two components. The second component is 
ad .Q§llum, which refers to the permissible recourse to war. 
Unlike j~§_.i.~_.QgllQ which deals with the conduct of war, ~s ad 
bellum is concerned with the purpose of war. <21> Ju§_§._Q_.Qgllum 
consists of the concepts: "competent authority"; "just cause"; 
and "right intention". 
!;;.ompetent author..!.1Y.. "Competent authority" usually rests with the 
state. It usually allows states the right to wage war for the 
purpose of maintaining peace, order and stability. Thus this 
authority relies on an order of sovet-eign states •,-1here "orde~-" is 
the primary value. Competent authority may also rest with the UN. 
This shift of authority is important for a later argument w~er 
the just war doctrine will be applied to revolutionary war. 
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Suffice it to say that in its search for justice the UN may pass 
resolutions condemning the aggression of a state against its own 
people. Thus it may be possible for the UN to condone 
revolutionary war. 
J:.ld§.t_caus§."Just cause", accol""ding to St. Augustine, arose "when 
some wl""ong has been avenged, when a nation Of"" state is to be 
punished fo,..- having failed to make amends fo,..- the wrong done, Of"" 
to l""estol""e what has been taken unjustly."(22> In model""n times 
just cause is influenced by the Westphalian notion of a world 
Ol""de,..- - an Ol""der of states. The l""ights which at""e pl""otected or 
seen as threatened, are the rights of states. 
Right intention. "Right intention" means that bel 1 iger-ents in a 
Wal"" must have the right intention. In othe,..- wo,..-ds the intention 
of war must not be gl""eed or cruelty but the desil""e for peace. 
Evans ar-gued that the tr-aditional "just war" is interpreted as 
upholding the value of a stable orde,..- at the expense of 
justice. <23) He wl""ites that the present thinking emphasizes an 
order of states' rights, not justice, such as human rights. Evans 
argues that ther-e is a bias in favour of the state in the 
tl""aditional intetrp,..-etation of "just war". 
The traditional just wal"" doct,..-ine may be alte,..-ed to suit changed 
cir-cumstances. It may be open to the international community to 
determine whether a people have the right to use fo,..-ce in the 
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service of justice. It is suggested accordingly that a 
supranational authority may be recognized to have the authority 
to determine the justice of any war, be it traditional or 
revolutionary war. 
The UN Charter has revived notions of just war. Dugard writes: 
"In the article 2<4> o-f the Charter, member states 
undertake to 'refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use o-f -force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state'. The 
UN Charter does not, however, outlaw the use of force 
in all cases, as it recognizes the right to use force 
in self-defence and specifically provides -for the use 
of force under the authority of the Security Council. By 
outlawing the use of force in some cases and permitting 
it in others, the Charter put an end to the 
Machiavellian phase of world order and heralded a return 
to the Grotian distinction between just and unjust 
warfare. Wars waged other than in sel-f-defence or under 
the authority of the UN can now be categorized as 
unjust or unlawful, with the result that international 
law once again discriminates against the 'unjust' 
belligerent." (24> 
The foregoing argument does not proclaim a modern version of the 
just war because it refers to states being attacked. But if 
Article 51, which justifies the use of force, is re-interpreted, 
then a new conclusion may be reached. 
Dugard mentions that Article 51 of the Charter provides 
justification for the use of force. He also adds that Article 51 
has been subjected to broad interpretations. According to him, 
wars of liberation have been justified "as a defensive action 
under Article 51 of the Charter aimed at the assertion of the 
principle of self-determination."(25> 
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A new interpretation could thus justify the PLO's use of force 
against Israel. But only on condition that the Palestinians who 
are subjected to alien domination are by definition the "victims 
of aggression". The PLO's revolution may be seen as a "just wa1-", 
aad may thus be brought within the scope of Article 51. 
The revolutionary war fought by the PLO is presumed to be 
illegitimate according to traditional just war- thinking. (26) By 
what pr-inciple is the PLO to be condemned? Some may say that 
their actions are anomalous, otherwise one would ask whether this 
is to be the norm in the new world order. This problem cannot be 
answered in terms of conventional moral arguments. The literature 
has shown, however, that a new interpretation of just war is 
possible. 
O'Brien, one of the writers found in the literature, attempted to 
adapt the just war doctrine. After O'Brien explained the 
traditional doctrine of "just war", he argued that the doct1-ine 
could be adjusted so as to judge non-traditional wars, such as 
revolutionary wars. <27> 
In the following part of this section O'Brien's adaptation of the 
doctrine of "just l..iar 11 w i 11 be used to answer the quest ion: 11 can 
the national revolution of the PLO be justified?" In m-de:-- to be 
able to find justification for the Palestinian national 
revo 1 ut ion~ the poss i bi l i tv of a _ius~ggll.\:!.~ of ~-evo 1 u ti on 
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needs to be demonstrated. In other· words the elements af ..i!d§._.§..Q 
bellum - "competent authar·ity"; "just cause"; and "right 
intention" - must apply ta nan-traditional wars. 
Palestinians may be able ta derive their "competent authot··:ty" 
from the argument that Israel does not have the authority to 
govern them. They may also argue that they have competent 
authority based an self-defence af the people [nation]. A more 
valid authority may be the international community, specifically 
the UN. 
To provide a "just cause", the Palestinians may claim ta be 
pursuing the sovereignty af the people. And, they may also argue 
that Israel oppresses their fundamental human rights. <28) But the 
PLO revolution needs to be consistent with the proportionality 
between the "probable good and evil of the war". 
"Right intention" fm· the Palestinians could be the contr·ol o-f 
their awn state, although it could also be the adoption of 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, which allows for defence against 
aggression <see what Dugard has to say seven paragraphs back). 
One may conclude that traditional thinking about just war, with 
the exception af St. Augustine's humanitarian interpretation~ 
exemplified the value of order. Machiavelli's emphasis an self-
inter~st as well as Grotius's attempt to limit war influenced the 
value of a stable order· of sovet·eign states. Pet·missible ~·ecoL.wse 
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to war was to maintain order not to establish justice. The value 
OT order was held to be above the value OT justice when there 
were judgements on traditional wars. On the other hand a non-
traditional war, the Palestinian revolution, introduced the 
opposing proposition that a reason to go to war could also be the 
vindication OT justice. IT the Palestinian struggle were to be 
recognized it would show that the purpose OT war may also be 
justice and not only order. Previously the PLO, judged according 
to the traditional just war doctrine, would have been labelled 
deviant. But the Palestine question, among other causes, has 
inTluenced the international community to elevate the value OT 
justice. This is possible because the just war doctrine has 
developed Trom a Christian interpretation through natural law and 
Grotius's international law interpretation to the present day 
conception OT the UN Charter. 
2.3 Revolution 
The explanation OT the PLO is seen as having implications TOr an 
understanding OT world order. It may be possible that a global 
approach <use oT perspectives> to revolution rather than a narrow 
theoretical approach, could be more suitable Tor understanding 
the role revolutions play in the evolution OT the world order. 
The Palestinian National Charter expresses the goals OT the PLO. 
One OT its goals is to achieve revolution. <29> Thus, within the 
scope OT this study the question needs to be posed: "what is the 
best way to explain violent revolution, such as the PLO's 
revolution, so that it may be accommodated by the perspectives?" 
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This section will consist of the following parts in order to 
develop the argument: 
1> A brief description of the PLO's revolution. 
2> Examination of the more salient scientific empirical 
theories of revolution as propounded by Gurr, Johnson and 
Davies. It is important to note that these theorists,by 
concentrating on causes of revolutions, ignore the goals of 
revolutionaries. 
3> A demonstration that the empirical theories are not 
explicit about normative issues. They avoid explaining the 
true role of national revolutionary movements in the evolution 
of the world order. Thus there is a need for contextual 
understanding of revolutionary conflict with reference to 
international political circumstances. Burke's normative 
theory is more appropriate for considering prevalent norms in 
the international society. 
The aim of this line of argument is to try to understand the role 
of revolution in the evolution of the world order. The use of 
empirical theories could stunt such an understanding. However, 
the use of normative theories could improve such an 
understanding. This problem needs to be addressed if the 
perspectives are to accommodate the violent national ~-evolution 
of the PLO <discussed in chapters still to come>. 
At the Fourth National Congress of the PLO in 1969 Vasser Arafat 
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said: 
"The Palestinian r-evolutionaries are now undertaking 
revolutionary action throughout Palestine. Even the 
Palestinians under- occupation since 1948 have r-evolted 
and star-ted to resist Zionist occupation, to desb·oy its 
military institutions and pasts and to rally ta the 
revolutionary anwa~-d march." (30) 
Is the PLO indeed engaged in revolution or the eviction of Isr-ael 
from the occupied ter-ritories? There seem to be two issues - that 
of the occupied West Bank and Gaza and that of the whole of 
Palestine. If the PLO is engaged in a revolution what goals do 
they seek to fulfil? Murphy could have the answer when he writes: 
"Hence revolutionary violence, or 'wars of national 
liberation' to use the communist formulation, most often 
seeks to fulfill one or more of four goals: first, to 
separate a colony from rule by a colonial power-; second, 
to overthrow a government deemed <by the rebels) to be 
oppressive; third, to allow minority 'peoples' to secede 
from the territory of a state and establish their own 
country; and fourth, to overthrow a racist, minority 
government and install one government by the majority . 
... Similarly, the Palestine Liberation Organization, as 
well as some Arab states, attempts to justify violence 
against Israel in part an the grounds that it is in 
colonial, or 'settler', control of the West Bank, and 
the Gaza Strip, that it is 'racist' in its Zionist 
doctrine, and that its governance of the occupied 
territories is an oppressive denial of the inhabitants' 
right to sel+-detel'"mi nation." <31) 
The reason, not cause, for- the Palestinian revolution is that 
they are engaged in a fight against "oppression" and "injustice". 
It is important to observe that the revolutionary ambitions 
within the PLO emanate from Marxist-Leninist groups within the 
PLO. Ellenberg writes: 
... that the guerrilla war had to be made a people's 
war, by the mass involvement of Palestinians. Such a 
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war, through such involvement, could only occur if it 
was directed at more than a mere recapture of the 
homeland. Its dynamic thrust had to be the socialist 
restructuring of Palestinian society. Yet, as this 
restructuring could scarcely succeed in isolation, it 
would be necessary to spread the revolution throughout 
the Arab world, the proper context of the Palestinian 
issue."(32> 
The above quotation indicates that the PLO resorted to violence 
in an attempt to bring about fundamental political, social, 
economic and cultural change. 
There exists no single definition of revolution. But, as a point 
of departure, one may recognize revolutions as events which bring 
about social change. A more apt definition is that revolution is 
"violence directed toward one or- more of the following 
goals: a change of government <per-sonnel and 
leadership>, of r-egime (for-m of government and 
distr-ibution of political powetr), or of society (social 
str-ucture, system of property control and class 
domination, dominant values, and the like)."(33) 
The PLO's revolution could fit this definition. However, this 
section bases the definition of "revolution" on the PLO's own 
interpretation of this concept. 
The problem is that any attempt at a general theory of 
revolution, following scientific guides, is too remote from the 
international political reality to be useful. The theories which 
are pr-oblematic are the social-psychological, ~unctionalist, and 
economic approaches of Gurr, Johnson and Davies respectively. 
Explanation for them depends on the causes of preconditions and 
precipitants which are not regarded as useful for the purposes 
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of this study. 
Four different kinds of inquiry into revolution are possible: the 
philosophical approach; the comparative historical approach; the 
Marxist approach; and the theoretical approach. 
Four principal theorists are associated with vat·ious theories 
Burke, <34> with the philosophical approach; Skocpol, <35> with the 
comparative historical approach; Cohan, (36) with the Marxist 
approach; and finally, the one which will receive attention in 
this chapter, Gurr, <37> with the behaviouralist-empirical 
approach. 
Ted Gurr's theory, described in his book Why_!'.!en Rebel. <38) is 
based on the phenomenon of relative deprivation. Relative 
deprivation ''is the discrepancy the people perceive between what 
they expect and what they are likely to obtain". Expressed 
another way it means that value expectations increase faster than 
value capabilities. People begin to feel a sense of frustration 
as a result of the failure to meet expectations. When the 
relative deprivation relates to political goals, then violence or 
revolution will develop. Frustration is expected to cause 
dissatisfaction. This, in turn, explains whether people will tu~n 
to violence. Political conflicts are, therefore, explained in 
terms of socio-psychological assumptions. Gurr tries to explain 
which conditions will lead to violence or revolution. To be able 
to answer, he examines ''factors affecting the development of 
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discontent in a society."<39) According to him an example of" 
decremental deprivation is to be f"ound among members and 
supporters of" the PLO. <40) After the Six Day War in 1967, the PLO 
had no hope of" establishing a homeland and so they turned to 
terro1~ ism. 
Chalmers Johnson's <41) attempt at a general theory leads to his 
examining the stress within the processes of society. Rapid 
change, in his view, leads to system disequilibrium. For him, a 
social system has to be -functioning or "in equilibrium". There 
have to be certain requirements for a social system to be able to 
function. Revolution is seen as dysfunction which causes 
disequilibrium. Changes either within the system, or from without 
the system, cause this. Oysf"unction means that integration of 
parts within a social system fails. If the social system cannot 
adapt to change dysfunction occurs. So what causes the 
revolution? Johnson points to an "accelerator" or "precipitants". 
For example, an event such as defeat in a war causes a loss of 
loyalty to the government. Johnson's theory is functionalist, and 
therefore is more concerned with how conflict is contained than 
with change itself. Johnson explains revolutions by identifying 
and examining factors which may be responsible for the 
malfunctioning of the system. He finds a relationship between the 
condition of structure and revolution. If this were valid, then a 
system would be able to react to change and to preserve the 
social system. This is not true~ however. Sometimes whole systems 
are transformed into other kinds of systems. 
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James Davies <42> proposed an economic explanation of revolution. 
A favourable situation for revolution occurs when there is 
economic growth followed by a sudden decline in the economy. 
During the economic growth expectations rise, and during the 
downturn, which Davies cal ls the "J-curve", a disc1~epancy appea1~s 
between expectations and satisfaction. Finally the frustration of 
the people finds an outlet in violence. The potential for 
revolution may be reached when the economy declines. It is 
interesting to note that in Davies's explanation revolution is 
not caused by poverty and misery because of the economic decline 
but rather by expectations not being fulfilled. Instability in a 
society may be the result of economic forces. 
Why should a theoretical understanding of revolutions be regarded 
as inadequate? Any positive empirical theory is deterministic in 
its approach and separates value from fact. It therefore expla·i~s 
only "what is". Revolution cannot be explained in an objective 
way. Such a study will always view the revolutionaries as 
"deviant" and not undet·stand their role in developing the woY"ld 
order. Thus understanding of revolution must be one of contextual 
understanding. "True knowledge" about a revolution must not be at 
the expense of objective, scientific explanation. A scientific 
theory will fail to comprehend the moral questions of the 
situation. World order issues, such as revolution, must be 
understood as a process of political change. It is therefore 
necessary to understand revolution while stressing the normative 
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cl'"itet"ion "what ought to be" in the wot"ld ot"det". Unlike the 
theot"etical appt"oach, this appt"oach t"ecognizes voluntarism o~ the 
t"evolutionat"ies and tries to understand how they create 
themselves within the world ot"der. 
Aya in his at"ticle titled Theories of Revolution Reconsidered, 
tt"ied to l'"enew an interest in a political model. He wl'"ites: 
"Theories of !'"evolution, to resume, fal 1 into tht"ee main 
lines of thought: <1> the outside-agitator model, which 
imagines revolutions and lesset" public distul'"bances to 
be the work of subversives who, with a sinistet" genius 
for cajolery and coel'"cion, provoke otherwise 
disintel'"ested masses to violence; <2> the volcanic 
model, through which civil strife appears to be periodic 
eruption of social-psychological tensions that boil up 
in human groups like lava undet" the eat"th's cl'"ust or 
steam in a geyser; and <3> the political model, in 
which the sound and fury of public violence signify 
shifting power balances and stl'"uggles for hegemony 
between contenders for control o-f the state."<43) 
Aya's political model (in number 3 in the above quotation> should 
not detain us hel'"e any longer, except to mention that Aya 
success-fully shows that revolutions should not be likened to a 
volcano because !'"evolutions at"e political phenomena and al'"e not 
il'"l'"ational et"uptions. Aya believes that a !'"evolution is a 
delibel'"ate undet"taking fol'" discel'"nible political t"easons. It is 
ther-efore not a sign of abnot"mal "collective behavioul'"". In Aya's 
model, the PLO could be seen as a "contendel'" +or contt"ol of" the 
state". Hence the PLO's r-evolution could be seen as a historical 
pt"ocess having significant consequences for the world order. In 
contl'"ast, the theories of Gurr, Johnson, and Davies are 
recognizable under number 2 of the quotation above. 
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This study's critique of the three theorists mentioned, reveals 
that revolutions are not studied as political phenomena. 
Revolutionaries are not seen as competing actors within the wot·ld 
order. Instead descriptions of revolutions are constructed from 
causes. Aya mentions that no matter what the magnitude of the 
grievances may be, no revolutionary group will be able to act on 
these grievances unless it receives recognition for its cause 
from within the political arena. 
The theories of Gurr, Johnson, and Davies account for grievances 
but whose grievances? They use the concept "society", instead of 
seeing a non-state nation. They see revolution as a "malfunction" 
within a "social system". Befor·e a revolution can start, they 
claim, objective conditions must first be present. By doing this 
they deny that a national revolutionary movement may have 
calculated political goals, formulated independent of economic or 
social conditions. Gurr will have one believe that the goals of 
the PLO were formulated because members of the PLO suffered from 
psychological depr·ivation. Rather, the PLO's goals were defined 
because of deliberate political initiatives. 
As for Johnson, his disequilibrium of a social system labels any 
actors in favour of change as deviant. Violence for him is a 
result of psychological disorder and is not accepted as political 
bargaining. Johnson fails to understand that disequilibrium cauld 
be a source of a new order. He does not acknowledge that a new 
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higher order may arise from disorder. 
A common error in a theoretical approach to revolution is its 
emphasis on a "society" in disequilibrium. If politics is bt~ought 
into the picture, the focus will instead be on the state and 
revolutionary groups, who are contesting power. The political 
process should not be reduced to socio-psychological factors. 
The behaviour of the PLO, because it is engaged in a revolution, 
is explained with reference to the theories of revolution. But 
the objective scientific theories of revolution are incapable of 
explaining the PLO's true role in the world order. 
Previously in this section it was mentioned that there are both 
Burke's philosophical approach and the Marxist approach to 
revolution. These two approaches represent alternative ways of 
understanding revolution. 
Freeman, when wr-iting on Bur-ke's theor-y, mentions: "My diagnosis 
is not that curr-ent empirical theory is •wrong' but rather that 
it is incomplete." (44) Accor-ding to Fr-eeman, the Bur-kean theoY-y 
was superior to the empir-icist theor-y of revolution because it i~ 
not explicit about nor-mative issues. Fr-eeman gives advice as tc 
what is needed for "future scholar-ship on r-evolution". He s:;.ys: 
"It is a need for contextual under-standing of t-evolutionar-y 
conflict". This means that revolutions ought ta be studied by 
reference to inter-national political circumstances. 
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An example would be the 1973 General Assembly's resolution on the 
prevention and punishment OT international terrorism. The 
resolution 
".!:.§!aTTirm.2 the inalienable right to selT-determination 
and independence OT all peoples under colonial and 
racist regimes and other TOrms OT alien domination and 
upholds the legitimacy OT their struggle, in particular 
the struggle OT national liberation movements, in 
accordance with the purposes and principles OT the 
Charter and the relevant resolutions OT the organs of 
the United Nations."<45> 
This resolution indicated that the international community 
legitimized national revolution. This study suggests that a study 
OT revolution should be more normative - that it considers norms 
which are prevalent in the international society. Perhaps then 
national revolution will stand a better chance OT being 
accommodated by the perspectives. 
Another theory which may be of more use, is the Marxist theory, 
which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. Because it 
is prescriptive it is associated with national revolution and may 
there-fore present a -far more "appropriate" explanation. 
What has just been discussed is an argument that the empirical 
theories do not consider that national revolution, in this case 
the PLO's revolution, could be relevant to the notion o-f world 
order. The scienti-fic theories analyze the world order as "it is" 
but the normative ideas o-f Burke and Marx examine "what ought to 
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be''. The question of revolution in the world order should be seen 
as a moral one. Questions such as the legitimacy of national 
revolution and the right of self-determination can only be 
clarified according to the methods of philosophy not empirical 
theories. Only in this way can one understand the influence of 
revolution in shaping the world order through profound change in 
norms in international politics. 
The revolutions of non-state nations cannot be accommodated by 
the perspectives if they are explained only by empirical 
theories. However, in chapters still to come, the possibility of 
the perspectives explaining non-state nations will be discussed. 
2.4 National Self-Determination 
There are two approaches to the Palestine question. One is the 
USA's approach, and the other is the international community's 
approach which is an approach based on UN resolutions. The former 
implies that any resolution to this international issue would 
have to be in accordance with the USA's national interest, 
whereas the latter implies that moral imperatives of the UN would 
have to serve as a basis for a resolution to this international 
issue. Thus the approach which prevails will determine the 
outcome of the PLO's moral claim of national self-determination. 
The principle of self-determination will be referred to as 
"moral" rather than "legal" because it is recognized by the UN 
Chat·tet· and is not a "legally enforceable claim". Thus moralit'/, 
in this case, is intended to mean the common consent of the 
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international community. The aim of this section is to indicate 
that in the past any attempt at resolving the Palestine question 
was influenced by the USA's interests. But now there could be a 
shift to the moral principle of self-determination as a solution 
to this problem. The argument will take the following direction: 
a brief history of the PLO; the goals of the PLO; the USA's 
national interests; the concept of self-determination; and the 
"two state solution". 
The PLO was founded in 1964. It is an umbrella organization of 
several subordinate organizations. The two more important 
movements being Fatah which is led by Vasser Arafat, and the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine <PFLP) which is 
led by George Habash. (46) Fatah's goal is Palestinian nationhood. 
The PFLP, is also involved in a struggle to form a Palestinian 
state but because it is Marxist and therefore more radical, it is 
involved in a revolutionary struggle. 
The PLO has moved through four phases. (47) The first phase was 
the founding of the PLO during the years between 1965 - 1967. The 
second phase started after the 1967 Six-Day War, and lasted until 
the civil war with Jordan in 1970. This was a mobilization 
period. The third phase lasted until 1973, after the Yorn Kippur 
War. This was a time of radicalization. Finally, the fourth phase 
was the period from 1973 to the present time, including the 
intifadah (uprising in the occupied territories>, which began 1~ 
1987. This was a time of recognition and legitimization. 
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These four phases signify a distinct evolutionary precess in the 
reformulation of the PLO's objectives. There was a shift away 
from exclusive reliance on the armed struggle to negotiations. As 
the PLO became more moderate, they started to settle for a 
Palestinian state within the 1967 frontiers, thus accepting the 
"two state solution". 
The PLO has a national goal. <48) For conflict to be resolved, not 
merely managed, the Palestinian expectations will have to be met. 
A solution based on UN resolution 242 must satisfy more than 
rectifying Zionist "oppression", but must also satisfy the 
Palestinian expectations of self-determination. 
The PLO, through the political process, is trying to make the 
moral principle of self-determination acceptable ta the world 
community. 
The PLO's striving for legitimacy has been associated with its 
political goal of national self-detet'"mination. (49) First the PLO 
had to establish its legitimacy as a true national liberation 
movement. This it did by becoming mot'"e independent from other 
Arab states and developing a strategy of "armed struggle". At 
first it did not demand a state for itself, because this might 
have antagonized other Arab states. The "armed s tr-ugg le" L•Jas 
still retained as this was by now the instrument to achieve the 
political goal of a Palestinian state. Before this could happen, 
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some negotiations had to take place with Arab states such as 
Egypt and Jordan, so as to gain legitimacy from them as a 
national movement. The PLO was now not only fighting for its 
freedom from the domination of an outside power, but was also 
demanding a state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Not only the 
legitimacy of their goal was important, but the PLO had also to 
be the sole representative of the Palestinian people. 
There has been a major shift in policy by the PLO. Arafat 
accepted the conditions laid down by the Americans, before talks 
could resume. These conditions were: 
"AcknoirJledging the right of Israel to live in peace and 
security, confirming UN Security Council resolution 242 
(which calls for the withdrawal of Israeli.armed forces 
from territories occupied during the 1967 war> as the 
basis fo1- negotiation, and renouncing ten·orism." C50l 
The main grievance of the Palestinians is well noted by Khalidi. 
He wrote: 
"Palestinians did not and do not deny the historical and 
spiritual connection between Jews and Palestine. What 
they could not and cannot endorse is that after a lapse 
of 2000 years, contemporary Jews anywhere have an 
overriding political right in Palestine which negates, 
supersedes, and annuls the political rights of the 
Palestinians in their 011-in homeland." <51 l 
In the first paragraph of this section it was mentioned that 
thet·e at·e tl'llO appt·oaches to this inteY"national issue: "a 
comprehensive settlement under international auspices and a 
"peace process' conducted under United States supervision''. <52> 
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Peace negotiations conducted under USA supervision were 
influenced by its national interests. The USA had a strategic 
interest in Israel, as it has relied on Israel to maintain 
stability in the Middle East. The USA's interest was in a stable 
region where it could have influence. The threat of war in the 
Middle East escalating to include the superpowers was always 
there, however. (53> 
The interests of the USA appeared manifest the last time the USA 
intervened in Middle East peace talks. In September 1978, the 
Camp David accords were signed by Egypt and Israel, with 
President Carter acting as mediator. (54> The USA was engaged in a 
Cold War strategy more suited to superpower competition in the 
Middle East. Because the USA had an interest in Israel's 
security, there could be no solution to the Palestine question, 
based on the moral principle of self-determination. 
The s~perpower competition influenced the USA's interpretation o~ 
national interest greatly because the Americans saw the PLO as 
Soviet surrogates. <55) They also wanted to reduce Syria's 
influence in the region and also welcomed the destructio~ cf PLO 
bases in Lebanon. The Reagan administration.was also in favour of 
supplying arms to Israel, because ending international terrorism 
was part of United State's foreign policy. 
During the Cold War period any settlement which involved the USA 
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could not have included Palestinian self-determination if it 
affected the securitv of Israel. America always emphasized 
terrorism which was seen as a threat to Middle East peace. (56) 
The Palestinian goal of nationhood was therefore not seen as 
legitimate by the Americans as long as the USA was influenced by 
Israel's interpretation of its own security. Israel's security 
has remained an important part of the USA's national 
interest. <57) 
There have been major changes within the world order. The foreign 
policy of the USA no longer has to defend US hegemony against 
communism. In Israel itself circumstances have changed. There has 
been a turning point in the PLO's armed struggle. The i~11£~~ah 
had impressed public opinion in the USA by 1985 where the 
conflict was no more seen in Arab-Israeli terms but in 
Palestinian-Israeli terms. There was a change of technique by the 
PLO. The Palestinians started to demonstrate and strike. This 
protesting within the boundaries of the occupied territories was 
most likely influencing world opinion to recognize the 
Palestinians' right to national self-determination. <58) 
In October 1991, multi-party peace talks were held in Madrid. 
President Bush told reporters that 
"Without spelling out the US interpretation, he str-essed 
that the talks would be based on UN Resolution 242, 
which calls for Israel t6 withdraw from the West Bank, 
Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem - all of which it 
captured in the 1967 Middle East War- - in exchange for 
peace ,,ii th A1~ab states." (591 
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What is notewm-thy about these peace talks is that they wer-e. "a 
comprehensive settlement under international auspices'' and not a 
"'peace pr-ocess' conducted under- United States supetrvision". 
Another very important point is that these talks would grant 
limited "autonomy" to the Palestinians in the Isr-aeli-occupied 
territor-ies. Was this a step near-er- to self-determination for the 
Palestinians? 
The concept of self-determination has two aspects: 
"One is cultural, involving the desire of a specific 
group to define itself in ter-ms of •we' and •us' and 
to explain the historical and historiosophical reasons 
why it should be distinguished fr-om other- groups. The 
other is political, involving the gr-cup's desir-e to 
translate its cultural distinctiveness into sovereignty 
and political independence."(60> 
In the PLO's National Charter-, the Palestinians refer to 
themselves as "a people". <61> For thei1r claim of self-
deter-mination to be taken seriously by the international 
community, they will have to separate themselves from Arabism, or 
the rest of the Arab people, and refer to themselves as a 
Palestinian nation. To do otherwise would ensure that they remain 
in the cultural aspect of self-determination, mentioned in the 
quotation above, and do not properly proceed to the second 
political aspect. 
In the second part of the quotation above there is a r-eference to 
a claim to sovereignty. This requires the PLO, to strengthen 
their claim, to link their- Palestinian identity and asserticn to 
territory. This is a requirement for statehood in international 
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legal terms. To achieve this, the Palestinians should accept the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip instead of asking for all of Palestine, 
as a possible Palestinian state. This could meet the US half-way 
in negotiating a "peace for land", as well as complying triith UN 
resolution 242. 
Different interpretations of the concept of self-determination 
cause problems. Woodrow Wilson elevated self-determination to the 
level of a universal human right. <62) This perception of self-
determination does not see people as possessing a legal 
personality as a state, but as having the collective hJman rights 
of its members. Self-determination may also be defined within the 
scope of the UN covenants. It is from the UN Charte~· that self-
determination may derive its meaning. Because of its recognition 
by the UN Charter it has become a legal principle of the law of 
nations. This means that the concept of self-determination has 
become linked to the nature of international society. <63> In 
other words the international community focuses on the 
sovereignty of a people as a nation and the status of national 
units. This interpretation permits self-determination to mean 
independence from alien rule. Thus the problem that these 
interpretations bring about is : who may claim the right of self-
deter""mination - "a people" at· a nation? Dinstein points out that 
the inte~·national community must diffet·entiate between "a people" 
and a "nation". (64) The issue must t·est on which nations the 
international community, in the form of the UN, . . , , . .. ls w l.:..:. l ng v=· 
recognize as sovereign. One may conclude that people must first 
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attain national status, be+ore they can claim sel+-determination, 
unlike "a people" 1.i'Jho can only claim human l'"ights violations. 
The PLO is prepat'"ed to accept a two-state solution. <65> For- it to 
be acceptable to lsl'"ael, lsl'"ael's security would have to be 
assul'"ed. In the past, the intel'"national community was not 
prepared to consider the two-state solution. The resistance to 
such a solution has been that it would weaken the secu1~ity o+ 
Israel. It is there+ore necessary to guarantee that both Israel's 
and the Palestinian's intel'"ests will be served. Only one state 
can guarantee this, and this state is the USA. It was previously 
discussed whether the sel+-interest o+ the USA created the 
situation that mol'"al principle was not considel'"ed. The status-quo 
will not provide a stable wol'"ld order unless Israel's security 
+eal'"s at'"e addressed and the Palestinians l'"eceive theil'" 
independent state. 
A sovereign Palestinian state is tied to the security needs o+ 
Isl'"ael. Thel'"efore an independent Palestinian state should not be 
a threat to Is,.-ael. Is,.-ael wi 11 have to be convi need that 
Palestine will not be a military threat or a terrorist threat. 
Palestine need no longs!'" be thought o+ as a likely Russian 
military base. These are the guarantees which Israel needs. Any 
change in the world ordel'" must include an international guarantee 
to peace. 
In the past, resolutions to the Palestine question were 
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influenced by the USA's national interests, which strongly 
condemned "tet·rorism". Such a policy refused to adequately 
understand the goals of the PLO, and thus defined them as 
"deviant". The foundation of this misunderstanding is the 
disagreement about the moral principle of national self-
determination. Changes in international politics, such as the 
demise of communism, have resulted in the USA and Russia shifting 
this international issue from one of competition, to recognizing 
that a solution must be found by cooperation. This transformation 
in attitude has raised the hopes that a solution may include the 
moral principle of self-determination for the Palestinian nation, 
as this is the only solution that will not only offer peace and 
stability, but also justice. 
2.5 Conclusion 
It is important to understand that the major changes in the 
international system have little to do with the Palestine 
question. However, to be able to understand the role of non-state 
nations, after the disintergration of the former Soviet Union and 
the demise of communism in Eastern European states, the PLO 
set·ves as an "ideal type". This single case of a non-state nation 
has been responsible for an unstable world order for some time. 
Its affect on the processes and structure of the state system 
cannot be denied. Scholars studying the various aspects of a non-
state nation, such as the PLO, have put forward alternative ideas 
which challenge prevalent thinking about world order. 
89 
Although the present world order is structured according to a 
Westphalian notion of sovereign nation-states with an interest in 
stability~ some writers have introduced the international 
political community to new perceptions about the world order. 
These writers disregarded conventional thinking on woY-ld 0t-de1-, 
and showed that there were shifts in thinking about: how non-
traditional wars should be judged in the world order; how to 
identify main actors in the world order; how the behaviour of 
national revolutionaries should be explained in the world order; 
and, how self-determination may be used as a solution to an 
international issue. 
Normally traditional wars are judged by the "just war-" doctr-ine. 
Writers have shown that the PLO's non-traditional war may be 
judged by this doctrine. Traditionally the main actors in the 
world order were sovereign states. But certain writers have 
pointed out that nation-states, as well as non-state nations, 
should be main actors. The behaviour of revolutionaries <in this 
case the PLO> is usually explained by scienti~ic theories. But 
writers have introduced an alternative explanation of revolution, 
which does not understand revolution isolated from change in the 
world order. Finally, the national interest of states influenced 
any solutions to international issues. But the Palestine question 
has y-e-affirmed the belief in national self-determination as a 
solution. The outcome of the above debates all have implications 
for thinking about the world order. 
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An obstacle to any t1··ans-fot·matian in the wot· Id 01-det·, is the •.·Jay 
one thinks about world order. One uses a perspective <realism, 
idealism or Marxism) ta structure the world order, therefore 
before there can be any adjustment to change, there must be 
change in one's thinking. In Chapter 1 (under the sub-heading 
Pro bl em : "Perspective E-ffect") "perspective ef-fect" was de-fined, 
which roughly means: perspectives resist any change ta their 
world view. The consequence a-f this is that they remain in 
"perspective paralysis" because they are static in theit· 
application ta nan-state nations. If this continues, they will be 
unable ta accommodate non-state nations. 
If non-state nations are to be integrated into the international 
system, the -following will need to be addressed by the 
international community. 
1) The criterion to identify main actors needs to be changed from 
"sovereignty" to "autonomy". 
2> The critet·ion to judge war needs to be changed f~·om "order" to 
"justice". 
3> The behaviour o-f actors in the world order needs to be 
prescribed in a normative fashion, relying on the criterion of 
"i.-Jhat ought to be" r·athet· than employing tr:e cr·itet·ion of "•·;h.=.t 
is". 
4> Solutions to international issues need to be based on the 
crite,..-ion of "mor·al impet·ative" instead of on tr:e ct·ite•·ior: of 
" n at i on a l i n t er· es t " . 
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PART THREE 
WORLD ORDER PERSPECTIVES OF REALISM, IDEALISM AND MARXISM. 
3 Introduction 
CHAPTER 3 
REALISM 
Realism as a perspective used to understand the nature of 
international politics cannot be ignored. It dominated the study 
of international relations from 1940 to 1960 and again during 
Kissinger's reign in foreign affairs in the 1970's. Today there 
could be an emerging new world order - actors other than states 
are involved in international politics. The problem is the 
rising importance of the non-state nation which may not 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the state. The rise of this issue 
affects the international community's understanding of 
contemporary world order. Realism's meaning of world order, 
which is a system of sovereign states, is challenged. Why are 
non-state nations not accommodated by realism? It is suggested 
that realism cannot accommodate non-state nations because of 
"per-spective effect". 
This chapter intends to see whether realism can not only be 
revived but also adapt to a new situation in the world order. To 
be able to do this, four of realism's dimensions will be explored 
to see whether r-ealism can be flexible. This is examined within a 
framework of four- functions of a perspective. 
1) Judgements - justice versus order, when judging war in the 
wm· l d or- de r-. 
2> Main actors - autonomy versus sovereignty, when selecting 
actors in the world order. 
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3) Explanation, or- pr-escr-iption - "what ought to be" ver-sus "what 
is", when explaining ot• pr-escr-ibing behaviour- in the wo~·ld or-der-. 
4) Solutions - moral imperative versus inter-est, when offering 
solutions to international issues in the world order. 
The above will car-respond to the following headings: 1) 
Philosophical foundations of realism; 2) nation-state as an 
institution; 3l balance of power and the concept of power; and 
nee-realism; and finally 4) national interest. 
3.1 Philosophical Foundations of Realism 
Contemporary realist judgements on war can be traced back to the 
influence of political philosophers such as Niccolo Machiavelli 
(1469 - 1527>, Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679) and George Hegel <1770 
- 1831), who all fall within the realist framework of 
international politics. The assumptions of these philosophers 
make it impossible foy Yealism to accommodate the non-traditional 
wars of non-state nations. To examine this proposition this 
section will attempt an answer to the question: how do realists 
judge war- - do they use the criterion of order or the criterion 
of justice? 
Machiavelli placed emphasis on the idea that the survival of the 
state is of paramount importance, and to ensure this, moral 
standards should not determine ~olitical actions. In his book, 
The P~·ince, he concentrated on how the ruler- should "gai::, 
maintain and expand power.''(1) For Machiavelli politics 
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resembled a clash of interests which is brought about by the 
pessimistic nature of human beings. One can recognize in these 
ideas notions of mode~-n-day national security and .!::.§.~l.Q.Ql.i.i:!.k 
(power politics among states>. 
Hobbes expt-essed his ideas in his book Levi~j;_han. Fm· Hobbes 
international politics takes place in a state of anarchy because 
no central authority exists. Nations exist in a state of nature 
which creates a condition of war, "every one against eve~-y one". 
Thus political life is organized around the reality of power. 
Fundamental to the realist way of thinking is the position the 
state holds. Hegel was one of the political philosophers who 
elevated the status of the state by laying the foundations o+ 
the modern state and lending a significant meaning to the 
concept of the state. 
These three works, considered a legacy +ram European political 
philosophy, deal with the acquisition of political power, with 
the establishment of sovereignty, and with the introduction of 
the ascendency in political philosophy of the nation-state, 
whereby its integrity and sovereignty is maintained. To fully 
comprehend the contribution made to the idea of realism by these 
political philosophers, it will facilitate understanding to 
attempt answers to the following three questions: 1) what was the 
nature of world order at the time these philosophers wrote? 2) 
Why did anarchy prevail, was it because of human nature? 3} 
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How was order and justice maintained in this international 
anarchy? Because contemporary realists retain the same 
assumptions as these three classic philosophers, they are 
therefore relevant to the present question: why can realism not 
accommodate non-traditional wars of non-state nations? 
The realist's notion of the nature of world order can be 
explained by the "Hobbesian pt-edicament" of mankind. <2> Because 
no common authority exists to impose ordet-, a state of nature 
exists, which allows for a "perpetual and restless desire fo;--
power" and "by that condition which is called war". Hence the 
world is in chaos and the behaviour of states can be explained 
by Hobbes: II Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, 
because of their Independency, are in continual jealousies, and 
in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons 
pointing, and theit~ eyes fixed on one another; that is, the::.1-
Forts, Garrisons, and Guns, upon their neighbours." <3l F~-om th2 
above quotation one can understand that an international society 
does not exist. There is a relationship of conflict amongst 
sovereign states and violence Car threat thereof) can be 
expected. 
Although !::..§.Y.i.21haD is on domestic societies, Hobbes's ideas a•- 0 
relevant to international politics and have already made an 
impact on ideas of t-ea l ism - Therefore, when Hobbes speaks of " 
wat- of every man, against evet-y man," he means that the•-e is 
no right or wrong, and that if no power exists, law cannot exis~ 
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and therefore the use or threat of force will determine matters. 
States, like men, are by nature equal and can claim for 
themselves any benefit whatever they can by force. This image of 
world order is based on the assumption that men are fearsome and 
selfish and act only in their own interests. (4l 
This idea of realism is correct. But there is another dimension 
that is also correct, but the international community may fail 
to observe the notion of justice in realism. Hobbes's conception 
of justice is connected to his idea of law of nature. <Sl This 
means that if there is no covenant then rights have not been 
transferred. If a covenant existed, and one broke this covenant, 
then this would have been unjust. Seeing that no covenant 
exists, states, like men, must defend themselves from 
destruction. Justice for realists thus means: that states, like 
men, are forbidden to do anything destructive to themselves. 
What is the reason that world order is organized in such an 
anarchical way? Hobbes's answer to this anarchical condition 
rests on a psychological theory about the nature of man. Hobbes 
says that "although man wants peace, his fear of others, his 
anxiety to maintain what he already has, his selfish and 
grasping desire for still more - these basic appetites ard 
aversions lead him to continuous strife with his neighbours.'' (6' 
Machiavelli on the other hand did not develop a psychological 
theory as Hobbes did but was rather concerned with egoism as a 
motive which can lead to a corrupt society. <7> Behind political 
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policy is the assumption that human nature is essentially selfish 
so that statesmen should strive for power and secure security for 
the masses. His main concern was that a government cannot be 
effective under circumstances of a corrupt society. This implies 
that the struggle and competition for power be seen as natural 
behaviour in political society because of man's aggressive human 
nature. Machiavelli proposes that the prince must be proficient 
in the use of force when dealing with beasts and use law when 
dealing with men. <Bl 
Hobbes offers a different solution to the state of anarchy. He 
suggests that men surrender liberty for security, renouncing 
certain rights to the sovereignty so that the sovereignty can 
protect them. <9l According to him, for men to live socially, 
they have to be restrained by fear, because human nature has a 
tendency towards domination. In other words there will be peace 
and security if certain rules, which Hobbes calls ''laws of 
nature 11 , < 10 l are fo 11 owed. Hobbes makes an ana 1 ogy betv-Jeer: 
states in international anarchy and individuals living without 
government. <lll Hobbes tries to show that states in a state of 
nature are to be· regulated, but just like men in a state of 
nature, their natural instincts and tendencies are not held in 
check. As Hobbes said; during the time men live without a 
common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition 
which is called Warre; and such a warre, as if of every man, 
against every man .... 11 ( 12) 
106 
How is order and justice supposed ta be maintained in such an 
anarchical international society? The relationship between 
states is characteristic of a struggle for power for security 
reasons and self-preservation at any cost and using any means 
available, therefore a government will depend on force and 
craft. A system is created whereby sanctions, in the farm of 
rewards and penalties, is introduced so that utilitarian 
calculation will show that it is more advantageous to conform 
than challenge the system. Hobbes believes that force is the 
factor that will pt·oduce and maintain o,.-der. <13) Security, he 
asserts, depends on power, and a country needs power to defend 
itself against invasion. (14) Hobbes further believes that 
"covenants, without the sword, are but wards and of no strength 
ta secure a man at al 1. " ( 15) Such a view of international 
politics encourages a lust for power which could be abused in a 
situation of war. 
Machiavelli, by articulating a new theory of statecraft at the 
time, 1-ejected the "just war" doctrine. His basis fo;· o;·der· ;.ias 
that leaders had to strive for power. Hence reasons of state 
took priority over considerations of justice. He wrote: 
"When it is a question of the sa-Fety o·F the countr·y no 
account should be taken of what is just or unjust, 
mer·ciful o . ..- ct·uel, laudable or shameful, but without 
regard to anything else, that course is to be 
unswervingly pursued which will save the life and 
maintain the liberty of the [father·landJ."(16) 
Thus just war is secondary to self-interest. However, the ''just 
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war-" of this time was still based on Chr-istian values. Gr-otius's 
"just war-" which was based on natur-al law, had not been 
-fat·mulated yet. In any case, the philosophy of Machia'1elli 
indicates that he would most probably have rejected the second 
just war- doctrine as well. 
Why was the just war doctrine rejected? The answer comes from a 
writer of that time, Alberico Gentili. He wrote that war became 
a political matter- and that morality or religion was no more 
relevant to the question of war-fare. War became acceptable in 
the relations between states <realpolitik), and the "justice of 
a cause in war was not confined to one side."(17) A new 
evaluation of war resulted - previously war was evaluated by 
using the medieval docttrine of "just war". This idea was 
rejected for one that emphasized the ef-ficiency of war to 
preserve the state and the world order within which states 
operate. These philosophical foundations explain why present-day 
realists are preoccupied with power, and do not attribute rights 
to other members of the international society other than states. 
No matter- how unjust or unsatisfactory a state system may 
become, the value of the preservation of order does not allow 
non-traditional wars of non-state nations for the promotion of 
"just" change in the wot· l d or det·. 
The basis of international order, during Machiavelli's time, was 
diplomacy. (18) The diplomacy of .t:::..§..§!l.£.Qliiib. maintained orde~- as 
it dealt with the pursuit of a country's interest while 
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recognizing the interest of other states, hence exalting the 
state. 
If the exaltation of the state is justified, then the state will 
affect the world order, as then the importance of the world 
community will be subordinate to the importance of the state. 
Hegel wrote that the state is the highest form of political 
existence. <19) According to him a man is not just a membetr of a 
society but must be the subject of the state. Thus the nation 
which is not embodied in the institutional framework of a state 
will not exert influence in international politics. Could this 
mean that the individual must surrender his freedom to the 
control of the state? 
Hegel maintains that the state creates freedom for the 
individual. He couples the search for freedom with the st~iving 
of national self-realization. <20) This can only be achie'.1ed if 
individualism is discarded and the state has claims to higher 
ideals. Hegel thinks so, because fot· him the state is morally 
superior to civil society. <21) 
For Machiavelli, the purpose of the state can be explained by 
the idea that "the end is the possession of powet·, no mat tet· 
what the power is used for."(22) Hobbes believes that the state 
should be created to curb the individual's passions, thereby 
taming human nature, as this is the only way to attain peace and 
secutr i ty. ( 23) Hege 1 sees the purpose of the state, not .:. ·-..L _JL;.: L.. 
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looking after the individual's welfare and security, but it is 
the state that will allow the individual to reach self-
realization. <24> The justifications expressed above all point tc 
the acceptance of the idea that the state should have no 
authority over it. 
If there is no obligation to respect other states and there 
exists no mechanism to enforce laws in international politics, 
can one deduce from this premise that power excludes moral 
rights and that force, as the determining principle of conduct, 
be the only right? There seems to be a consensus among the three 
antecedents of realism, namely that there should be no 
obligation to international law. Machiavelli could be accused of 
mo r a 1 i n d i ++et- e n c e w he n he says th a t " po 1 i t i ca 1 1 i + e i s s e pa i-- ate 
-From mot-al li+e". But Machiavelli does t-ely on prudence "which 
consists in knowing how to distinguish the character o+ trouble, 
and for choice to take the lesser evil". Hobbes's view on moral 
rights is revealed in his statement that: "Where there is no 
common powet-, thet-e is no law; whet-e no law, no injustice." <25> 
To understand his phrase it is necessary to comprehend that 
Hobbes equated law of nations (relation o+ sovereign states) with 
that of his law of nature (before civil society). In other words 
nations in the law of nature have a similar right to protect 
themselves as do individuals in a law of nature. Hobbes says we 
will be just if we keep contracts, not because we are morally 
bound, but merely because it is to our own advantage to do so, 
unless the situation is controlled by a supreme power. Hegel 
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states that International law is developed because of the 
relations between autonomous states. The state should be 
t'ecognized as sovereign and its fo~·eign relations is the concet-r: 
only of its domestic politics. <26l 
Although the ideas of realism were not fully developed at the 
time these authors wrote, one may conclude that it was sometimes 
prudent to break laws as long as they were advantageous to a 
state. The reason for this is that at that time, there was a 
departure from making natural law (idealism) the basis of 
international order and justice, to a notion of natural rights 
<natural rights of Hobbes>. <27) Hobbes's approach to the question 
of right and wrong in international anarchy is influenced not by 
natural law but by natural right. By the right of nature, each 
man must do what is necessary to preserve himself from injury. It 
is therefore the right of states to secure their own survival. 
This natural right resembles the modern-day realists' notion of 
justice. To create order in the world, emphasis was placed on the 
rights of the sovereign state but justice had to be sacrificed in 
the form of denying a right to rebel <28> or offer resistance to 
authority <the ruler>. <29> This implies that non-state nations 
may not engage in revolution against the state. 
Realism's assumptions regarding international order and the state 
suggest that realism cannot accommodate the non-traditional wars 
of non-state nations. Realists primarily rely on the critericn of 
order when judging war. But it cannot be said that they neglect 
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the criterion of justice. Realists do have a regard for justice, 
as long as it is their notion of what." justice" should mean. 
It is as if the philosophers of the day had not foreseen the 
interest of a nation over that of the state. <30) This oversight 
still poses problems in modern-day international politics where 
disputes between non-state nations and states escalate into 
international disputes, because today the state is still deemed 
to be the main political actor. 
3.2 Nation-state as an Institution 
Realists use the legal term of "sovereignty" to identify the 
main actors in the world order. The realists, by persisting in 
granting such a high status to the state, cloud international 
political issues. Sometimes the state is not the most important 
actor in the world order. For example, in spite of sovereignty, 
the Israeli state is being undermined by a non-state nation, 
such as the Palestinians. This indicates that another actor, 
other than the state, can exercise influence in the world order. 
Thus the autonomy of a nation is challenging the sovereignty of 
the state. The erosion of state sovereignty means that realists 
fail to identify all the significant actors in the world order. 
It will be argued that an actor be appraised not in legal terms 
of sovereignty but rather in terms of autonomy which considers 
the impact an actor has on the international arena. This new 
concept of the autonomy of an actor will be difficult to accept 
because the concept of the nation-state has prevailed in modern 
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history. 
Since the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, (31) the concept of the 
nation-state has come to dominate international relations. The 
phenomenon of this concept can be seen as the link between 
people, their nationality and international status. The peace 
ended war in Europe and established a system of sovereign states 
which rejected the political authority of the Pope. This system 
accepted no higher authority than the self-ruling political 
states. Although states were free to seek power, they had to do 
so within the Westphalian treaty recognizing the concepts of 
legitimacy and sovereig,nty. C32l 
During the evolution of the state, legitimacy of the ruler was 
challenged on numerous occasions in history. These were attacks 
on regal legitimacy, such as the Declaration of Independence in 
1776 (thirteen North Amet·ican colonies), and from 1870 to to-day, 
the proliferation of states increased, resulting from colonists 
challenging the legitimacy of the rulers once more, in the name 
of national self-determination. One notes from the above that the 
first attack was against European states engaged in building 
colonial empires during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Later in the eighteenth century the stats system was 
once again being challenged, this time by the French and American 
revolutions - the king as ruler of the state was in question. And 
from 1870 onwards, national entities were fighting for 
independence from the state empires. 
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That was not the only challenge that took place. Marxists had 
fundamentally a different conception of the state and attacked 
the "illegitimate" rule of the bourgeois class. 
The evolution of the state complicates the search for a meaning 
of "state". Papp defines nation-state as : " a state whose 
inhabitants consider themselves to be a nation". A definition of 
the state is: 
a geographically bounded entity governed by 
a central authority that has the ability to make laws, 
rules, and decisions, and to enforce those laws, rules 
and decisions within its boundaries."(33> 
Although the difference between state and nation-state has been 
explained, there is still some ambiguity about the concept of 
"state" which still needs to be clarified. 
Nett! comes to the conclusion that there are different ideas of 
stateness. <34> The notion of the state is ideologically 
conditioned. This can be understood by examining the relationship 
between society and state. For example, in the liberal and 
Marxist traditions, the state is subordinated ta the society. In 
contrast, Hobbes does not recognize society to be an entity 
without political order, and Hegel believes "the state to be the 
realm of universal values beyond the concerns of society."<35) 
Given this situation, is the purpose of the state contrary to the 
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wishes of society? For Northedge, 
state) means the needs and interests of the state take preference 
to any other interests. <36) He denies that the pu~·pose of the 
state is met·ely to maximize powet· but rathet· that the r_ai§.Q.Q 
_g.:_§ta.t is the secw· i ty of the state. Nevertheless, states st i l:: 
need to engage in cooperative behaviour if the goals are to be 
achieved, therefore .r:.Eison _g.:_§1~1 is linked to the national 
interest of a state (which will be discussed later). To attempt a 
link between raison d'etre of the state and society, it is better 
to consult Kristof's idea on the subject. According to Kristof, 
although the raison d'etre expresses a ''fundamental statement of 
purpose", it must be sustained by a collective psychology VJhich 
was formed from traditions and ambitions, as well as from above 
<that is, the state). If the raison d'etre, as Kristof claims, 
depends on the traditions of a nation and the consciousness of 
society then different raisoD _ _Q.:_g1re should emerge depending on 
the type of state. Fat· instance, a laissez-fai1·e state's !::.~isor: 
_Q.:_g1.r:.g will considet· the freedom and natural rights of 
individuals, as apposed ta an ideological state's .r:.Eiso~ _ _Q.:_§1.!:.§ 
which encourages the superiority of the state over society. <37l 
The conception of "state" gives rise to a problem. Brierly warns 
"that a state must not be confused 1r1ith the community that lives 
within its territory; nor should the state be confused with the 
nation (unless the state is organized along a national 
bas i s ) . " ( 3 8 ) The st a t e f m· h i m i s a n i n st i tut i o n - '"l h i ch i. s a 
system established to achieve certain goals within fixed rules. 
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It is because of confusion that the terms state, nation an~ 
nation-state are used interchangeably. According to Northedge, 
cet·tain distinctions between nation and state exist: "The nation 
is a self-identifying group based on such factors as a common 
culture, history and language; the state is a territorial 
association of people but not necessarily of the same 
nation."<39) This implies that the nation is influenced by a 
political tradition <beliefs and theories), and since territory 
is tied to international law, the state, on the other hand, is 
therefore a legal term. Whereas Northedge just says a state is a 
territorial association, McKinlay when giving a definition of the 
state, improves the definition because he brings together four 
attt·ibutes which are: "a population; a teiTitory; a gove1·nment; 
and recognition by other members of the international arena." (40l 
Papp does not deviate much from other authors mentioned when a 
definition of state was attempted. Except that he adds that the 
state is governed by a central "authot·ity". (41) This concept ::.s 
significant because it denotes the legitimacy of whoever is 
governing the state. 
Two characteristics of the state, namely the territorial 
imperative of the state and tert·itorial jurisdiction of the 
state, can lead ta international disputes, such as the Palestine 
question. Territory can be legally acquired only in certain ways. 
As long as force is used by states as a national policy 
annexation of territory would take place. 
international law, the international community could refuse to 
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recognize that a title of territory be changed after conquest. By 
applying this to the Palestine question, the international 
community would refuse to recognize Israel's occupation of 
Palestinian tert·itory. The Palestinian nation existed without 
territorial control but they need territorial control to become a 
state. <42> Nations without states and ethnic, religious, and 
linguistic separatist groups are a common occurrence in the 
world. The dichotomy between nation and state still raises the 
question; is every nation entitled to its own state? 
The conception of state does not coincide with the conception of 
nation. The state is more goal-orientated and influenced by 
political philosophical traditions, whereas the nation evolves 
through tradition and history and relates to the people. 
The concept of sovereignty can now be used to demonstrate the 
effect that every state enjoys exclusive jurisdiction ovet· its 
own territory, and how much international status a country can 
experience. A government may claim internal sovereignty within a 
state when it possesses the authority and force. This domestic 
jurisdiction is expressed in the United Nations Cha1·ter, Article 
2(7) II shall authorize the U.N. not to intervene in matters 
... within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."<43) There i~ 
an exception, and that i--~ if there is a threat to peace. Everv 
government is entitled to international sovereignty when it 
represents its own people in its own country. International 
sovereignty is a claim to equality of states <equal rights) in 
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the international system. Sovereignty is a legal concept, (44) and 
in both instances of internal and external sovereignty, no higher 
authority is recognized. There is a distinction between internal 
and external sovereignty. Although in internal sovereignty a 
state may recognize no higher authority (because it has 
jurisdiction and competence to make its ovm domestic latr1s), it 
still strives for external sovereignty <which means the equality 
of states in the international system). Internal sovereignty is 
about authority - an arrangement between state and community, and 
answers the question: "who shall have political power?" It has a 
necessary function which affects the intet·national system because 
it acts as a basis for international politics. 
Internally the concept of sovereignty can be used in explaining 
and justifying political authority. To be entitled to internal 
sovereignty a government must not only have the monopoly of power 
but must also have claims to authority and legitimacy. In other 
words, society must accept the institutions of the state. (45) 
McKinlay writes that "realists question the viability of a nation 
[state] if its monopoly of power is not considered legitimate, 
and if it fails to b·anslate its power into author·ity." (46) 
There have been assaults on the concept of sovereignty and 
therefore indirectly on the territorial state. Young, when 
writing about the challenges to the state-centric world, divides 
the challenging activities into two groups, integrationists 
(development of communication, transportation and technology>; 
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and transnationalists <activity across state boundaries>. C47l 
Herz writing on the demise of the territorial state, believes the 
"har-d shell" of a state can be by-passed in vat-ious La.Jays Csucr: as 
economic warfar-e, psychological warfare etc.>. (48) The point here 
is that no matter- how capable a state is, penetration is 
possible. Even in the p6litical sphere some power of the state is 
lost. The Security Council of the United Nations has inherited 
some authoritative political control over states. (491 
The sover-eign state is being challenged as the main actot- in the 
wor 1 d or- der-. Thet-efore main actors in t.he wor 1 d order- shou 1 d not 
be defined by sovereignty, r-ather actors should be defined by 
autonomy. According to Mansbach: "autonomy refers to the ability 
of leaders of an organized unit to undertake behaviour that has 
consequences in international politics and cannot be predicted by 
reference to other actors or authorities."(50> This is a response 
to the question: do any actors, besides the states, exercise any 
influence in international politics? He recognizes that political 
units are able to make decisions and also influence other units. 
Mansbach adds; "that some states, in spite of being sovet-eigr., 
are unable to make their own decisions independently; whereas 
certain non-state actot-s, at-e autonomous and influential". He 
talks about non-state actors ~<Jho al'"e "tt-ansn.5tionally m-gani::::ed 
along milital'"y, economic and information lines."<51) The PLO, as 
a non-state nation, not only has these capabilities bu.t also has 
diplomatic relations with othel'" Al'"ab states. It may be implied 
that realists should consider main actcl'"s in terms of the imcact 
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they make on the world order rather than in terms of sovereignty. 
The state is not as omnipotent as what is suggested because 
sometimes non-state nations may undermine the integrity of the 
state. 
The discussion of nations within a state helps to clarify the 
disintegration of certain states. Sometimes there are changes 
within the state itself. Non-state nations with a strong sense 
of national identity may ~hallenge the sovereignty of the state. 
Many times the result is the break-up of the state which they 
believe oppresses them. It must be pointed out that state 
sovereignty is undermined only by a specific kind of community. 
These are nations without states. As they are usually separatist 
groups they undermine the state from below. They are usually 
deprived communities which assert their own national self-
determination. For example, the French in Quebec, Flemish 
community in Belgium, the Slovaks in Czechoslovakia, the Ct·oats 
and Slovenes in Yugoslavia, the Basques in Spain, the Catholics 
in Ulster, and the Palestinians in the occupied territories. 
This assertion of national identity poses a problem: contrary to 
traditional custom, the sovereign state is not the only 
significant actor. 
Realists, by insisting that the criterion of sovereignty be used 
to identify significant actors exclude an important acto~- in the 
world order - the non-state nation. 
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3.3 Balance of Power and the Concept of Power 
Realists use the theory of balance of power to explain the 
behaviour of states within the international system. The 
international system will determine the choices a state 
exercises. <52> How nation-states will compete or co-operate in 
the world order will depend on their relative power. The 
behaviour of states cannot be explained independently of the 
international system but rather their choices will depend on the 
action of other states. Because the relationship between the 
state and the international system is based on the concept of 
power, a structure can be identified which recognizes the right 
of states to participate in the international system. Such a 
system can be sustained if only states are seen as actors. 
Realists' explanation of world order concentrates on an 
international system which relies on power as a determinant. For 
realism to be able to explain a world order containing states as 
well as non-state nations, realist explanation needs to be 
adapted. 
Some scholars (53> have wt·itten about realism's possibility to 
reform. Bull, when expressing ideas on international society, 
writes that realists explain the behaviour of states within a 
system as "pur-e conflict betl'\Jeen states". But, he adds, there a•·o 
realists who think that morality and law are vali~ in context cf 
a society. GoodL·Jin V'Jrites about "realist reformists" L'>'ho ":;cce;:;"!:. 
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the relevance of moral principles" within an international 
society. The re~ormists. then, try to prescribe how actors should 
behave within a society <not a system). The implication of any 
change in the way realists explain world order is that instead of 
explaining "what is" <actual behaviour of states>, they will be 
prescribing "what ought to be" Chow states and non-state actat-s 
ought to behave). Because of this two questions may be asked: why 
does realism persist to explain behaviour of states within an 
international system? And, how would the change to prescribing 
the behaviour of all actors within an international society 
affect non-state nations? 
Power as an analytical concept is only suitable in explaining 
characteristics of power within a state system which denies any 
legitimacy to non-state nations. Such an explanation is 
inadequate because it gives an incomplete description of the 
world order. The balance of power system needs to give way to a 
society of state actors, as well as non-state actors. 
What should be noteworthy are the ideas that the relationship 
between the state and the inter-national system is based on the 
concept of power and that in this structure only the state has a 
right to participate in the international arena. Another acto~, 
such as a non-state nation, cannot be explained within the 
balance of power concept. 
For states to survive. it is necessary that there exists ~ system 
122 
based on balance of power·. If the system as a whole conditions 
the behaviour of the state~ and a certain structure can be 
identified, can it then be claimed that for realism to work, it 
is of paramount importance that the more powerful states sustain 
and promote this system? 
An international system is not an international society, there is 
a distinction between the two meanings. For McKinlay "a system 
exists when each state finds it necessary to take the presence of 
the other members into its calculations."(54) Another 
characteristic of his system is that "relations in a system are 
depicted in zero-sum terms'' <increase in power for one state 
means a loss of power for another state>. Bull improves on the 
definition of an international system II is formed when two 
or more states have sufficient impact on one another's decisions, 
to cause them to behave as parts of a whole." "In a system there 
will be communication amongst states, but there will be no 
commitments to legal obligations; diplomatic institutions; and 
agreements."(55) 
An inter-national society on the other hand, is "wher·e common 
rules and institutions operate". Bull offers a mm·e detailed 
definition of international society: II ... a group of states, 
conscious of certain common interests and common values, 
conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of r-ules in their 
relations with one another, and share in the workings of common 
i ns ti tut ions. " < 56) 
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The distinct~on between system and society is important because 
each one provides a different kind of order in international 
politics. 
"Bull defines international order as 'a patte~-n of 
activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals 
of the society of states, or international society'. 
Goals such as preservation of chief bearer of rights and 
duties within society; being the principal actor in 
world politics; having supreme jurisdiction over 
subjects and territory; maintaining independence or 
external sovereignty; peace; security; justice; 
limitation of violence; acceptance of war waged for a 
just cause; keeping promises <pacta sunt servanda>; co-
operation on the basis of agreements; and stability, are 
all affected by the kind of international order 
prevai 1 i ng." <57) 
An international system must precede an international society. 
Thus an international society cannot exist without there first 
being an international system. For example "states may be in 
contact and interact such as to be necessary factors in each 
other's calculations without them being conscious of common 
interest or values, concerning themselves to be bound by a common 
set of values, or co-operating in the working of common 
institutions". In other words states may interact in alliances, 
war and commerce, and not necessarily co-operate in the common 
institutions. There may be communication and negotiation but 
common interest and values are absent in a system. An 
international system can therefore exist without being a society. 
It is important to analyze the dynamics of world order, as no~-
state nations can deprive states of theit· position as mai:, a~tc;·s 
in world politics. For a system of states to be transformed into 
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a society of states and non-state nations, there needs to be an 
acceptance of a structure of international legal obligation and a 
consensus in society. When this happens an international system 
also becomes an international society. An obstacle to this 
becoming a realization is realism's preference to analyze power 
within a system, rather than analyze common values within a 
society. 
Realism tries to explain a system of sovereign states because the 
independence of states and interests can only be secured within a 
certain framework of international order. A structural 
arrangement comes into play whereby the power relationship 
between states in a system creates two distinct characteristics 
of the structure; namely, a hierarchy of states, and an 
international balance of power. <SB> In an international system 
where no central authority exists, and therefore an anarchic 
climate exists, states are organized according to their power 
capability (hierat·chy). Within this system of states competition 
can take place but a technique for managing the power is needed. 
This technique is called balance of power which Morgenthau 
defines as: "l) a policy aimed at a certain state of affairs; 2) 
an actual state of affairs; 3> an approximately equal 
distribution of power; and 4) any distribution of power.''C59l The 
problem with Morgenthau's definition is that it has different 
meanings. In one case the balance of power is prescriptive and in 
another it expresses an actual state of affairs. It is important 
to note that it is not merely the balance of power which creates 
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peace, but the states who accept they have to restrain themselves 
and accept a consensus about the system of balance of power. The 
power aspirations of states will be kept in check by ''opposing 
forces''. Such a system cannot be kept functioning properly if 
non-state nations do not accept such an arrangement. It is a 
challenge to the state itself. Can balance of power, as a 
technique to manage power, contain the power of non-state 
nations? 
The function and purpose of balance of power is to prevent 
hegemony, preserve the international system, and ensure stability 
and security in the international system. The stability of the 
world order must be based on an equilibrium of forces. All this 
is t6 prevent the domination and expansion policy a state may 
have. The techniques used to maintain the balance consist of the 
formation of alliances, intervention, diplomatic bargaining, and 
superpowers having spheres of influence. It is apparent that 
states rely on other states to maintain an international 
equilibrium and that the balance of power tries to regulate the 
disparities in power which exists among states. Its main function 
is not the preservation of peace but the preservation of the 
state system, therefore it may sometimes be necessary to wage viar 
against a threatening power to maintain world order. No single 
state is allowed to become so powerful as to be able to coerce 
the other states. From this one may conclude that the relevance 
and effects of using balance of power as explanation of world 
order is limited to states as actors, because when the balance is 
